FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130)

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-6000

COORDINATING DRAFT

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***This publication supersedes FM 34-130, 8 July 1994.

FIELD MANUAL **Headquarters**
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Preface

This manual describes the fundamentals of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It describes IPB, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and its role in driving the staff's planning for military operations.

This manual conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FM 3-0 and FM 2-0.

This manual provides doctrinal guidance for the use of IPB in directing the intelligence effort and its role in supporting the commander and staff. It also serves as a reference for personnel who are developing doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and institutional and unit training for military operations.

This manual is intended to provide guidance for all commanders, staffs, trainers, and Military Intelligence (MI) personnel at all echelons. It applies equally to the Active Components (AC), US Army Reserve (USAR), and the Army National Guard (ARNG). It is also intended for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, US Naval and Marine Forces, units of the US Air Force (USAF), and the military forces of multinational partners.

This manual will not describe the TTP and applications of IPB. That information will be contained in ST 2-01.301.

Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the US Army Intelligence Center and School. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, ATZS-FDT-D (FM 2-01.3), 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017. Send comments and recommendations by email to *ATZS-FDC-D @hua.army.mil.* Follow the DA Form 2028 format and submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Administrative Instructions: The following publications are under development.

FM 5-0. *Army Planning and Orders Production*. When published (tentatively scheduled to be released in the fall of 2004), FM 5-0 will supersede that portion of FM 101-5 not superseded by FM 6-0.

ST 2-01.301, Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

WARNER I. SUMPTER
Brigadier General, ARNG
Acting Commander

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Chapter 1

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

PERFORM INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

1-1. The G2/S2 is the staff proponent for IPB. IPB is the staff planning activity undertaken by the entire staff to define and understand the battlespace and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. IPB includes input from the whole staff. There are not separate battlefield operating systems (BOSs) or staff section IPBs throughout the headquarters. IPB is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the threat and battlespace in a specific geographic area for a specific mission or in anticipation of a specific mission. By applying IPB, the commander and staff gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points in time and space. IPB is most effective when it integrates each staff element's expertise into the final products. To conduct effective IPB, the G2/S2 must—

- Produce IPB products that support the staff's preparation of estimates and the military decision-making process (MDMP).
- Identify characteristics of the area of operation (AO), including the information environment, that will influence friendly and threat operations.
- Establish the area of interest (AOI) in accordance with the commander's guidance.
- Identify gaps in current intelligence holdings.
- Determine multiple enemy courses of action (COAs) by employing predictive analysis techniques to anticipate future enemy actions, capabilities, or situations.
- Establish a database that encompasses all relevant data sets within and related to the battlespace.
- Determine the enemy order of battle (OB), doctrine, and TTP.
- Identify any patterns in enemy behavior or activities.
- Accurately identify and report hazards within the AO, including the medical threat and toxic industrial material (TIM).
- Accurately identify threat capabilities, high-value targets (HVTs), and threat models.
- Integrate IPB information into COA analysis and the MDMP.
- Update IPB products as information becomes available.

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1-2. IPB is an analytical process employed as part of intelligence planning to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. IPB is conducted during mission planning and throughout the conduct of the operation. It supports the commander's decisionmaking and forms the basis for direction of intelligence operations in support of current and future missions.

1-3. The doctrinal principles of IPB are sound and can be applied to all situations at all levels. The doctrinal principles of IPB call for—

- Evaluating the battlefield's effects on friendly and enemy operations.
- Determining the enemy's possible COAs and arranging them in order of probability of adoption.
- Identifying assets the threat needs to make COAs successful and where they can be expected to appear on the battlefield.
- Identifying the activities, or lack of, and the location where they will occur that will identify which COA the enemy has adopted.

1-4. IPB identifies the facts and assumptions about the battlespace and the enemy that allow effective staff planning. IPB—

- Forms the basis for defining friendly COAs and drives the wargaming process.
- Provides the basis for intelligence synchronization.

1-5. The IPB process consists of four steps, which are performed, or at least considered, each time the staff conducts IPB. Each step in the process is performed or assessed and refined continuously to ensure that the products of IPB remain complete and relevant and that the commander receives the needed intelligence support during current and future operations. The following are the four steps of IPB, which are discussed in detail in Chapters 2 through 5.

- Define the Operational (Battlefield) Environment.
- Describe Environmental (Battlefield) Effects on Operations.
- Evaluate the Threat.
- Determine Enemy Courses of Action.

1-6. The time available for completion of IPB may not permit the luxury of conducting each step in detail. Overcoming time limitations may require a determination on which products need to be developed and to what degree of detail in order to assist the commander in planning and executing his mission. Identifying the amount of detail required avoids time wasted on developing more detail than necessary in each step of the process. This action is accomplished by consulting with the commander and the staff in a time-intensive environment. A good technique is to work ahead as much as possible; establish a series of base products; keep the products updated by periodic review instead of waiting for the next receipt of mission; and keep

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threat databases up to date when developed intelligence indicates changes. The following factors can be applied to all situations at all levels in the IPB process.

- Backwards plan the IPB process and determine how much time can be devoted to each step in order to meet the commander's timelines.
- Evaluate the effects of the battlefield on friendly and enemy operations.
- Determine the enemy's possible COAs and arrange them in order of probability of adoption from most likely to least likely.
- Identify the assets the enemy needs to make each COA successful and where they can be expected to appear on the battlefield.
- Identify the activities, or lack of, and the locations where they will occur that will identify which COA the enemy has adopted.

1-7. The conduct of IPB can be facilitated by parallel and collaborative planning.

- Parallel planning requires significant interaction between echelons. The interaction and information sharing between higher and subordinate staffs will enable subordinates to plan concurrently with their higher headquarters.
- Collaborative planning enables subordinates to provide higher with their current assessment. In addition, collaborative planning allows the sharing of ideas and concepts such as COA development.

IPB AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

1-8. Commanders and staff use the MDMP to select a COA and develop an operation plan (OPLAN), operations order (OPORD), or fragmentary order (FRAGO) to implement that COA. The results and products of IPB are essential elements of the decisionmaking process. The relationship of the IPB process to the MDMP is discussed below.

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1-9. During this step, the intelligence staff performs an assessment of current intelligence holdings to identify information gaps. At the same time the staff uses intelligence reach to gather updated or additional intelligence. The intelligence staff should review its higher headquarters OPORD and Intelligence Annex. Based on the review, current staff estimates, and weather and terrain data, the G2/S2 should begin developing situation templates. The review and development of preliminary situation templates will prepare the intelligence staff for the mission analysis portion of MDMP.

MISSION ANALYSIS

1-10. In this step IPB products enable the commander to assess facts about the battlefield and make assumptions about how friendly and threat forces will interact on the battlefield. The description of the battlefield's effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs. It also

identifies key aspects of the battlefield environment, such as avenues of approach (AAs), engagement areas, and landing zones (LZs), which the staff integrates into potential friendly COAs and their staff estimates. Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities identified during Step 3 of the IPB process (Evaluate the Threat) allow the commander and staff to make assumptions about the relative capabilities of friendly forces. Threat evaluation provides the detailed information on the enemy's current disposition, recent activities, equipment, and organizational capabilities that the staff needs to complete its staff estimates and planning. For mission analysis, the intelligence staff, along with the other staff elements, will use IPB to develop detailed enemy COA models, which depict a COA available to the enemy. Enemy COA models are developed in Step 4 of the IPB process (Determine Enemy COAs). The enemy COA models provide a basis for formulating friendly COAs and completing the intelligence estimate.

1-11. The IPB process identifies critical gaps in the commander's knowledge of the battlefield environment or threat situation. As a part of his initial planning guidance, the commander uses these gaps as a guide to establish his initial intelligence requirements. If the three components (doctrinal templates; description of preferred tactics, options, and HVTs of a threat model; and the AO) are developed, the staff can develop possible combinations of enemy COAs for every mission before deployment, file them systematically, and retrieve them to assess and revise as needed during mission analysis.

1-12. The intelligence staff, in collaboration with other staff, develops other IPB products during mission analysis. That collaboration should result in the drafting of initial PIRs, the production of a complete modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO), a list of HVTs, and unrefined event templates and matrixes. IPB should provide a clearer understanding of the enemy's center of gravity (COG), which then can be exploited by friendly forces.

1-13. The G2/S2—

- Reviews friendly mission, higher headquarters intent, and AO and friendly AOI.
- Identifies intelligence gaps.
- Facilitates intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration by providing the commander and G3/S3 with an initial intelligence synchronization plan (ISP) and helps the G3/S3 develop the ISR plan.
- Coordinates with the staff weather officer (SWO) for weather data considerations, forecasts, and effects.
- Assists staff with terrain and weather effects on friendly and enemy forces.
- Performs, in coordination with topographic engineer teams, terrain analysis and visualization of AO and AOI.
- Identifies AAs, mobility corridors, and routes.
- In coordination with the Engineer staff, determines intervisibility lines and line of sight.
- Develops doctrinal templates with BOS actions.

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- Determines enemy composition and disposition, enemy mission, objectives, scheme of maneuver, and desired end state with assistance from other staff members.

- Coordinates with entire staff to identify HVTs.

1-14. The intelligence staff should not perform IPB in a vacuum. Staff officers from all sections will bring their own areas of expertise to the IPB process. Collaborative analysis will facilitate a greater degree of situational understanding. As an example, the G2/S2 can provide the G1/S1 with information on how the enemy may affect personnel replacement, casualty evacuation, or possible hospitalization plans. The G2/S2 can provide the G4/S4 with enemy information that may have an impact on friendly logistics efforts. The G5/S5 that understands the enemy situation will see how it will affect his civil-military operations (CMO). Conversely, the G2/S2 needs to tap the expertise of the other staff elements. Collaborating with the staff engineers can provide valuable information on terrain mobility and where the enemy is likely to emplace obstacles, as well as how the enemy could employ his engineer assets.

1-15. Commanders and staffs perform IPB. The G2/S2 is responsible for facilitating the IPB effort, but the intelligence staff cannot provide all the information or products the commander requires. Other staff elements or sections must assist the intelligence staff during the development of all IPB products. The IPB process can be adapted to planning below battalion level. Total staff coordination can improve the quality and speed of IPB products because the entire staff can adequately consider and address every enemy BOS in detail. A combined effort by the entire staff reduces the initial time required for IPB development and helps the command to begin the decisionmaking process in a more timely manner. Discussed below are examples of staff input into the IPB process.

1-16. The G3/S3—

- Reviews the G2/S2 evaluation of the enemy COAs.

- Reviews G2/S2 identification and evaluation of enemy engagement areas, battle positions (BPs), and kill zones.

- Assists the G2/S2 with terrain and weather impacts on friendly and enemy military aspects of the terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenue of approach, key terrain, obstacles, concealment and cover [OAKOC]). (See para 3-23.)

- Ensures that the G2/S2 has an understanding of the AO and other friendly maneuver limitations and parameters specified by higher headquarters.

- Ensures the G2/S2 understands friendly forces available.

- Develops, with assistance from the G2/S2, the ISR plan.

- Selects high-payoff targets (HPTs), target areas of interest (TAIs), and decision points (DPs) with the G2/S2 and fire support officer (FSO).

- Develops the decision support template (DST) in coordination with the staff.

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1-17. The Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD)—

- Assesses potential enemy artillery and mortar positions.
- Coordinates with intelligence staff to identify types of enemy artillery and related combat service support (CSS) and evaluates likely enemy artillery and/or missile positions.
- Assists the G2/S2 in developing the enemy fire support (FS) portion of situation and event templates.
- Assists the staff in identifying and evaluating potential engagement areas and kill boxes.
- Assists, in coordination with G2/S2 and the SWO, in determining what impact weather and terrain will have upon the enemy's artillery systems.
- Participates in the selection of HVTs, HPTs, TAIs, and DPs.

1-18. The Engineer Coordinator—

- Assists the staff in identifying and assessing obstacles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along friendly and enemy AAs.
- Provides the staff with input concerning enemy mobility, countermobility, and survivability, as well as doctrine, tactics, and equipment capabilities.
- Assists in developing the enemy engineer support portion of situation and event templates.
- Assists the G2/S2 with terrain analysis and products that support the IPB process and development of the MCOO.
- Coordinates with the G2/S2 and G3/S3 in determining engineer support to the friendly ISR effort and countering enemy ISR efforts.

1-19. The Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Officer—

- Provides input to the intelligence staff on enemy chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) doctrine, capabilities, and employment. Assists the staff in templating likely locations of enemy CBRNE assets and areas of use.
- Advises the staff on enemy doctrine concerning use of obscurants, its likely triggers for employment, and types of obscurant-generating equipment.
- Assists the staff in locating water sources that could be used by friendly and enemy forces for NBC decontamination operations.
- In coordination with the SWO, advises the G2/S2 on the impact of the weather and terrain on enemy NBC operations.

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1-20. The Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Coordinator—

- Provides input to the G2/S2 on location enemy rotary and fixed-wing air assets, capabilities, and employment.
- Assists the staff in identifying and evaluating enemy air AAs.
- Provides input to the G2/S2 on enemy ADA doctrine, its employment, and templating of likely ADA locations.

1-21. The G4/S4—

- In coordination with the G2/S2, identifies and evaluates enemy CSS capabilities as well as current and projected supply status, availability, and location of enemy transportation assets.
- Assists the staff in identifiying and evaluating enemy supply routes and resupply points.

1-22. The G5/S5 CMO—

- Provides an analysis of the effect of civilian population on military operations.
- Provides displaced civilian movement routes and assembly areas.
- Provides, in cooperation with FSCOORD, a protected target list including cultural, religious, historical, and high-density civilian population areas.

1-23. The G6/S6 provides—

- Information on enemy communication and information system maintenance status.
- Types and availability of enemy communications assets.

1-24. The G7 Information Operations (IO) provides—

- Enemy IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- Status of enemy IO assets, types, and locations.
- Enemy deception doctrine and plan.

COA DEVELOPMENT

1-25. The purpose of the COA development phase is to develop friendly COAs that are feasible, suitable, acceptable, complete, distinguishable, and fully integrate all combat multipliers. The staff develops friendly COAs based on facts and assumptions identified during IPB and mission analysis. Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities the environment and threat situation offer.

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1-26. The intelligence staff should develop as many possible enemy COAs as time allows, starting with the most likely and the most dangerous. By developing and considering all feasible enemy options, flexibility is built into the plan. The staff must consider that the enemy has varied options and capabilities when briefing mission analysis and portray and explain enemy options.

COA ANALYSIS (WARGAMING)

1-27. During COA analysis or the wargaming phase of the MDMP process, the staff identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission and positions the force for future operations. During the wargaming session the staff "fights" enemy COAs against potential friendly COAs. The G2/S2 role plays the enemy commander. The G2/S2 and his staff will use the full set of enemy COAs against each potential friendly COA.

1-28. The G2/S2 develops critical enemy DPs in relation to the friendly COAs, projects enemy reactions to friendly actions, and projects enemy losses. The intelligence officer captures the results of each enemy action and counteraction, and the corresponding friendly and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. The intelligence officer should try to win the wargame for the enemy. By seeking to win, the intelligence officer ensures the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each enemy COA.

1-29. Based on the results of wargaming each potential friendly COA against the full set of enemy COAs, the staff will be able to—

- Construct a DST and its associated synchronization matrix.
- Refine PIRs.
- Select HPTs from identified HVTs.
- Refine the situation and event templates and matrixes, including named areas of interest (NAIs) that support DPs.
- Arrange the enemy COA in order of probability of adoption.
- Address all relevant enemy BOS capabilities, DPs, end states, and vulnerabilities.

COA COMPARISON

1-30. Following the wargaming, the G2/S2 staff will finalize the intelligence estimate. The staff compares friendly COAs to identify the one that has the highest probability of success against the set of enemy COAs. The G2/S2 compares friendly COAs based on their ability to accomplish the G2/S2's ability to support the operation with intelligence.

COA APPROVAL

1-31. The staff will determine which friendly COAs to recommend to the commander. The COAs will be briefed to the commander who will then decide upon a COA and provide his concept of the operation. During this phase, intelligence confirms or denies planning assumptions on the battlefield environment and the enemy COAs. A continuous IPB process identifies new or revised intelligence requirements.

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1-32. The G2/S2 should prioritize the list of intelligence requirements to reflect his recommended PIR and present them to the commander. The commander will designate the most important intelligence requirements as PIRs, prioritizing them to reflect their relative importance. The remaining intelligence requirements are prioritized as information requirements (IRs).

1-33. The DST, intelligence synchronization matrix (ISM), and event template and matrixes are all finalized and completed during the COA approval phase. Also during this phase, at the G2/S2 level, the ISR plan and the ISP are refined.

IPB AND THE ABBREVIATED MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

1-34. The MDMP is abbreviated when there is too little time for a thorough and comprehensive application. However, all the steps of the full MDMP remain the same for the abbreviated process, only shortened. In-depth collaboration with higher headquarters, subordinate units, and other staff elements is crucial in an abbreviated MDMP. Products created during previous full MDMP should be used during an abbreviated MDMP.

1-35. It is critical to keep IPB products updated and to share the updated IPB products in a time-constrained environment. The use of technology is invaluable to the staff in these circumstances. Automated electronic production of mobility corridors, situation templates, doctrinal templates, and range fan for direct and indirect weapons systems can provide the commander visualization and aid him in determining the best friendly COA.

IPB AND TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

1-36. Troop-leading procedures (TLPs) are used to provide a framework for planning and preparing for operations at company level and below. The TLPs are integrally linked to MDMP. During MDMP subordinates should receive three warning orders (WARNOs). The initial WARNO will provide the subordinate commander information on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) as well as composition, disposition, and strength and most likely and dangerous enemy COAs.

1-37. From the information provided in the WARNO, subordinate commanders will conduct company or platoon planning. The four steps of the IPB process are used, but are narrow in their focus. The focus will be directed toward detailed information based on the OAKOC factors; the enemy's OB refining it down to the individual combatant, vehicle, capabilities, and limitations within the company or platoon battlespace. The intelligence staff should provide the commander or platoon leader with the necessary information and products needed to accomplish detailed planning at the company or platoon level.

1-38. Each commander and each member of the staff need to understand and apply IPB during the decisionmaking process. IPB identifies the facts and assumptions about the battlefield and the enemy that allow for effective planning.

IPB AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-39. The operational environment (OE) can be defined as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the

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decision of the military commander. There are six dimensions to the OE, which are described in detail in FM 3-0. The IPB process can assist the commander and staff reach an understanding of the OE and its six dimensions.

- *Threat***.** The threat dimension is any foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary of or challenge to the national security interest of the United States or its allies. IPB can provide the information on the enemy's intentions and military capabilities as well as his vulnerabilities. Developing and applying IPB against a complex set of enemy or potential threat entities will allow the commander and staff to understand what methods and capabilities the enemy will use to affect the friendly mission. Effective IPB will enable the commander and staff to have a higher degree of understanding of the threat and how it can impact operations and threaten US interests.

- *Political***.** The political dimension has an impact on strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. Applying the steps of the IPB process will provide the staff and commander with an understanding of local politics and the personalities that are associated with many aspects of an operation which could include the local political structure, treaty compliance issues, civil unrest, vigilante activities, and other non-military activities.

- *Unified Action.* This dimension has the Army acting as a part of a fully interoperable and integrated joint force in order to defeat an enemy. IPB can provide a common framework for the joint force to make assessments of the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. It provides the basis for intelligence direction and synchronization. IPB enables the joint force staff to maintain situational understanding.

- *Land Combat Operations.* Land combat operations are the destruction and/or defeat of enemy forces, and the taking of land objectives that reduce the enemy's effectiveness or will to fight. There are four characteristics of land combat operations: scope, duration, terrain, and permanence (FM 3-0). IPB—

  — Will be the basis for understanding what the enemy considers key and decisive terrain, his AO, and the effects of weather, terrain, and other significant characteristics of the environment on friendly and enemy operations.

  — Will help friendly forces understand the enemy's will to wage war, identify his economic ability to wage war, and how effective he will be in combat. IPB will identify what effect refugees, displaced persons, and other population groups will have on friendly and the enemy ability to conduct effective operations.

  — Can assist in identifying the enemy's COG and how best to attack those centers.

- *Information.* Within this dimension, national, international and non-state actors collect, process, and disseminate information. IPB enables the commander and staff to assess the enemy's capability to conduct IO and the enemy's vulnerability to friendly IO.

- *Technology.* Technologies enable the commander to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information faster and with greater precision. IPB will enable the commander to gain an understanding of the enemy's technological capabilities and vulnerabilities. By evaluating the enemy, the commander can determine if the enemy

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possesses advanced technology or capabilities, such as satellite imagery, computers, night vision devices (NVDs), or precision delivery systems. Understanding the level of technological sophistication of the enemy and use of modern technology will aid the commander in identifying the enemy's ability to fight in all types of weather and terrain.

ELEVEN CRITICAL VARIABLES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-40. In a conventional fight, the United States possesses a significant overmatch of warfighting capabilities. However, the enemy will seek through various acquisition means to gain parity or near parity. Our adversaries are continually seeking to acquire systems or technologies which will allow them to blind or deceive United States ISR, neutralize our precision attack means, and/or develop equal direct and indirect fire standoff systems.

1-41. Modernization efforts will allow adversaries to develop a strategy that is asymmetrical in focus and constructed around an indirect approach. There are eleven variables that help define and understand the contemporary operational environment (COE). These variables need to be considered when applying the steps of IPB, which will facilitate an understanding of the enemy and the OE. The eleven OE variables are shown in Figure 1-1 and discussed below.

- *Nature and Stability of the State.* The nature and stability of the state refer to how strong or weak a country is. It is important to determine where the real strength of the state lies; it may be in the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other element of the population. Using the steps of IPB to understand this variable will allow US forces to better understand the nature of the military campaign and the true aims of an enemy campaign, operation, or action.

- *Regional and Global Relationships.* Nation-states and/or non-state actors often enter into relationships, which can be regional or global. These partnerships support common objectives, which can be political, economic, military, or cultural. When actors create regional or global alliances, they can add to their collective capability and broaden the scale of operations and actions. These relationships will be fluid and unpredictable, and they will have common objectives. Commanders and staff must understand that an alliance can form or change, even during the course of an operation (for example, Afghanistan). Understanding all the actors and their motives within the AO and AOI is often critical to success.

- *Economics.* The economic variable establishes the boundaries between the "haves" and the "have-nots." This gap of economic differences among nation-states and other actors can cause conflict. Economic superiority rather than military superiority may be the key to power or dominance within a region. IPB identifies those elements of economic power that may be a significant characteristic of the battlefield. In a globalized economy, an enemy may leverage its economic power in a manner that affects friendly operations.

- *Demographics.* The demographics variable includes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup of a given region, nation, or non-state actor. IPB will enable the commander to understand the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within his AO. An evaluation of the situation and possible threats with these factors in mind will provide the commander with knowledge concerning underlying demographics that could affect operations. IPB can

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provide information on whether the population is sympathetic to the US or the enemy cause, or is uncommitted in its views to either the US or the enemy.

- *Information.* Media and other information means can make combat operations transparent to the world. Various actors seek to use perception management to control and manipulate how the public sees things. The enemy will exploit US mistakes and failures and use propaganda to sway the local population to support their cause. Media coverage can impact on US political decisionmaking, internal opinion, or the sensitivities of coalition members. The continued and rapidly increasing expansion of information technology and systems will greatly assist commanders. IPB can provide information on the enemy's ability to manage and manipulate information. It will inform the commander on the enemy communication infrastructure and its capabilities and vulnerabilities.

- *Physical Environment.* The main elements in the physical environment are terrain and weather. Potential enemies understand that less complex and open environments favor US forces. Therefore, the enemy may try to operate in urban environments, other complex terrain, and in weather conditions that may adversely affect US military operations and mitigate technological advantages. The IPB process provides for a complete analysis and evaluation of weather and terrain on military operations. An evaluation of the enemy will provide information on the enemy's preferred tactics, weapons systems, and how the enemy will use the environment to our advantage in weapons and acquisition standoff.

- *Technology.* The technology that nations or non-state actors can bring to the OE include what they can develop and produce, as well as what they can import. Access to technological advances on the global market is slowly eroding the technological advantage the US has enjoyed in the past. IPB provides information on the enemy's technological capabilities and vulnerabilities. It can identify as to whether the enemy has the technological ability to achieve equality or even overmatch friendly forces in selected areas.

- *External Organizations.* When the US Army goes into a failed state or into areas torn by conflict, it is likely to find non-government organizations (NGOs), international humanitarian organizations, multinational corporations, and other civilian organizations at work there. These external organizations can have both stated and hidden interests and objectives that can either assist or hinder US mission accomplishment. A defining of the battlefield environment should inform the commander as to the impact external organizations would have on mission accomplishment. IPB will provide information to the commander on whether civilian organizations will support or hinder mission accomplishment.

- *National Will.* The willingness of the people to support enemy military or paramilitary operations or be supportive of terrorist activities or insurgencies can be a significant characteristic of the battlefield. It will impact on the type and intensity of resistance the people will pose to US military operations.

- *Time.* Potential adversaries of the United States view time as being to their advantage. Because of the time it may take US forces to deploy into the area, our adversaries believe they can use this time to adjust the nature of the conflict. Adversaries will also seek to control the tempo of operations seeking to influence early entry operations to

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prolonging operations with the desire to increase friendly casualties. Commanders and staffs must consider time as an enemy COA when developing friendly operations.

- *Military Capabilities.* From the Army's point of view, the variable of military capabilities may be the most important. By using the four steps of the IPB process, a commander will be able to visualize all military capabilities of the enemy. It needs to be emphasized that our enemies will be flexible, thinking, and adaptive. They have the knowledge and ability to use a combination of conventional and unconventional capabilities. The commander can receive information on the enemy's conventional and unconventional capabilities, his ability to use modern technology, and the economic and political ability to impact on the commander mission.



Figure 1-1. Critical Variables.

REPORTING

1-42. IPB is a continuous process that is used to support planning and focus the intelligence effort. However, in order to keep the IPB process updated, information must flow from the top down and from the bottom up. IPB draws from all levels, but the best information or intelligence is often bottom up from small units. Information flow and reports from subordinates are vital to developing detailed situational awareness. Every Soldier, as part of a small unit, can provide useful information and is an essential component to the commander's achieving situational understanding. Every small unit needs to report information collected through observation and interaction with the environment. Such information can be used to update the products used in IPB.

Chapter 2

DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL (BATTTLEFIELD) ENVIRONMENT

2-1. Defining the battlefield environment identifies for further analysis specific features of the environment or activities within it and the physical space where they exist that may influence available COAs or the commander's decision. IPB efforts are focused on the areas and characteristics of the battlefield which will influence the command's mission.

2-2. Staffs must acquire the intelligence needed to complete the IPB process in the degree of detail required to support MDMP. Focusing on those areas and features which will influence friendly COAs and command decisions will save time and effort. Failure to focus on only the relevant characteristics wastes time and effort when collecting and evaluating intelligence on features of the battlefield environment that will not influence success of the command's mission. However, if all the relevant characteristics are not identified, the command may be surprised and unprepared because some overlooked feature of the battlefield exerts an influence on the success of the command's mission.

IDENTIFY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

2-3. Weather, along with climate and terrain, can significantly impact military operations. Weather elements are capable of altering terrain features and trafficability. By understanding weather characteristics, the planners will be able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by weather effects while reducing or minimizing adverse effects on friendly operations. The following are weather characteristics:

- Average precipitation.
- Temperature extremes.
- Light data (cloud cover).
- Wind speed extremes and direction.
- Humidity.
- Visibility.

2-4. To effectively use terrain information developed by the topographic engineer team, the commander and staff must understand the characteristics of the terrain and their application to the IPB process. The analysis of the terrain characteristics are used to assess the existing situation and are further used to develop the military aspects of the terrain (OAKOC/OCOKA). The following are terrain characteristics:

- Hydrological data.
- Elevation data.

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- Soil composition.
- Vegetation.

2-5. Characteristics of the battlefield that will influence the commander's decision or affect the COAs available to friendly forces or the enemy are of special significance in the IPB process. When identifying significant characteristics of the battlefield, consider enemy forces and all other aspects of the environment that may have an effect on accomplishing the unit's mission. These may include—

- History aspects (area study) and geography of the area.
- Wildlife.
- Diseases.
- Demographic Aspects:
  - Ethnicity.
  - Religion.
  - Languages.
  - Media (TV, radio, newspapers).
  - Density (population, buildings).
  - Age of population.
  - Living conditions.
- Political, social, and economic factors:
  - Allocation of wealth.
  - Means of income.
  - Economic disparities between various subgroups.
  - Political grievances.
  - Political affiliations.
  - Degree of loyalty to local, regional, and national governments.
  - Technology base.

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- Infrastructures:
  - Government services.
  - Transportation (trains, subways).
  - Lines of communication (LOCs).
  - Public service utilities.
  - Communications (Internet, cellular, fiberoptic).
- Banking.
- Rules of engagement (ROE):
  - Legal mandate.
  - Commander's guidance.
  - International treaties.
  - US laws.
  - Host nation laws.
- Enemy forces:
  - Military.
  - Paramilitary.
  - Terrorist organizations.
  - Drug trafficking and criminal organizations.
  - NGOs.
- Third-nation support.
- Weapons and equipment.
- Host nation military forces and police.

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IDENTIFY THE LIMITS OF THE COMMAND'S OPERATION FRAMEWORK (AREA OF OPERATIONS AND BATTLESPACE)

AREA OF OPERATIONS

2-6. An AO is an operational area defined by the joint forces commander (JFC) for land and naval forces. There are two general types of AO: contiguous and noncontiguous. When the AO is contiguous, a boundary separates them. When the AO is noncontiguous, there is no shared boundary. The concept of the operation links the elements of the force. The unit's higher headquarters is responsible for the area that separates noncontiguous AOs.

2-7. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. The evaluation of the battlefield's effects is more thorough and detailed with the AO than it is within the AOI. The limits of the AO are specified by the OPORDs and OPLANs from the higher headquarters that define the command's mission.

BATTLESPACE

2-8. Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and AOIs. The G2/S2 performs IPB and synchronizes ISR activities throughout the battlespace as determined by the commander's METT-TC factors.

ESTABLISH THE LIMITS OF THE AREA OF INTEREST, AREA OF INFLUENCE, AND THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY

ESTABLISH LIMITS OF THE AREA OF INTEREST

2-9. The AOI is a collaborative effort determined by the commander, operations officer, and the intelligence officer. Because the commander and staff need time to process information and to plan and synchronize operations, the command's AOI is generally larger than its AO and battlespace. The limits of the AOI include each of the characteristics of the battlefield environment identified as exerting an influence on available COAs or command decisions. The limits of the AOI should be based on the ability of the enemy to project power or move forces into the AO. The following also should be considered:

- Geographical locations of other activities or characteristics of the environment which might influence COAs or the commander's decision.
- Any anticipated future mission or "be prepared" and "on order" missions identified during mission analysis. Also determine their effects on the limits of the AOI.
- Changes in the commander's battlespace.

2-10. An additional consideration would be to divide the AOI into several components, for example, ground AOI and air AOI. Such a division accommodates the types of information

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relevant to each AOI as well as their usually different geographical limits. At some point, it will likely become necessary to integrate the various AOIs as a whole in order to present the commander with a complete, integrated picture of the battlefield.

2-11. One of the primary considerations in establishing the limits of the AOI is time. The time limits should be based not only on the enemy's mobility but also on the amount of time needed to accomplish the friendly mission. For example, if the command estimates that it will take two days to accomplish the friendly mission, the AOI must encompass all threat forces and activities that could influence accomplishing the command's mission within two days.

2-12. Since the limits of the AOI are based on threats to mission accomplishment, rather than strictly terrain considerations, they may cross into neutral countries. For example, political decisions in a neutral country may influence the accomplishment of the unit's mission; therefore, that country should be included within the limits of the AOI. Likewise, if the population of a neutral country provides a base of support for forces opposing the command's mission, include that country within your AOI.

ESTABLISH THE LIMITS OF THE AREA OF INFLUENCE

2-13. The commander, operations officer, and the intelligence officer determine the area of influence, which ideally will be bigger than the command's AO. By definition, an area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or FS systems normally under the commander's control. The following characteristics could limit the area of influence:

- Geographical disposition of the command's current systems.
- Lack of additional systems.
- Need to request a reduction in the size of the AO.
- Accepting the increased risk associated with being unable to provide security throughout the AO.

ESTABLISH THE LIMITS OF THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY

2-14. The AOIR is an area allocated to a commander in which the commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence within the means at the commander's disposal (JP 1-02). The commander is responsible for collecting information concerning the threat and the environment and for analyzing that information in order to produce intelligence. Higher headquarters also ensure through intelligence handovers, collection management, and deconfliction that problems with duplication, confliction, and command and control (C2) do not occur in the AOIR. They include the available ISR assets, capability of the G2/S2 section, available intelligence architecture, and METT-TC considerations. The AOIR cannot extend beyond a unit's AO; however, it can be smaller than its AO as well as vary (expand or contract) during an operation.

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Chapter 3

DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS

3-1. In describing the environmental effects, the G2/S2 and the rest of the staff are seeking to make a determination on how the environment affects both enemy and friendly operations. The end result is identifying how the battlefield environment influences the operation and COAs of enemy and friendly forces. If there is little or no effort to make this determination, then the commander will likely fail to exploit the opportunities that the environment provides. It is highly probable that the enemy will find and exploit opportunities that the command did not anticipate.

3-2. Understanding the effects on the environment allows the commander to quickly choose and exploit the terrain, weather, and various other factors that best support his mission. Successful interpretation of the environment aids in correctly applying enemy COA within a given geographical region. It also helps the commander visualize the potential impacts on conducting simultaneous or supporting operations.

3-3. Describing the environmental effects begins with the following steps:

- Analyze the environment:
  - Weather analysis.
  - Terrain analysis.
  - Other significant characteristics of the environment.
- Describe the environmental effects on enemy and friendly capabilities and COAs.

ANALYZE THE ENVIRONMENT

3-4. The degree of detail in the analysis will vary depending on the area of the battlefield environment you are evaluating. Generally, the evaluation of the AO will be more detailed than the AOI. Additionally, the focus will vary throughout each area. Certain areas will affect various types of operations in varying degrees. During the evaluation, identify areas that might favor one type of operation (for example, offensive, defensive, stability operations). Weather terrain and other significant characteristics are analyzed as part of the IPB process.

WEATHER ANALYSIS

3-5. USAF weather teams at division, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC) work together with topographic engineer teams and the G2 section during much of the analysis process. The weather team analyzes the weather's direct effects and its effects on terrain and other aspects of the environment; it integrates climate, forecasts, and current weather data with terrain analysis and the overall analysis of the environment. Weather teams can provide detailed descriptions of the weather's effect on each equipment system and subsystem.

3-6. Terrain, weather, and other aspects of the environment are inseparable. The analyst should include the weather's effect on terrain during terrain analysis. In this substep, weather analysis

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evaluates the weather's direct effects on operations. Evaluate the effects of each military aspect of weather. However, just as in terrain analysis, focus on the aspects that have the most bearing on operations and decisionmaking. Begin the evaluation of each aspect with the local climatology, but fine-tune the evaluation with the most current forecast available.

3-7. The Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS) produces the Integrated Weather Effects Decision Aid (IWEDA). The IWEDA provides a visual weather information product that shows the commander weather effects on current and planned operations. IMETS provides weather forecast products on wind turbulence, surface temperatures, cloud ceilings, humidity, visibility, and icing forecasts.

Military Aspects of Weather

3-8. **Visibility** is defined as the greatest distance that prominent objects can be seen and identified by the unaided, normal eye. It is important that visibility be evaluated in accordance with METT-TC. A major factor in evaluating visibility is the amount of available light. Consider the phase of the moon as well as times associated with—

- Begin Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT). BMNT is the start of that period where, in good conditions and in the absence of other illumination, enough light is available to identify the general outlines of ground objects and to conduct limited military operations. At this time, the sun is 12 degrees below the eastern horizon.

- Begin Morning Civil Twilight (BMCT). BMCT is the period of time at which the sun is halfway between beginning morning and nautical twilight and sunrise, when there is enough light to see objects clearly with the unaided eye. At this time, the sun is 6 degrees below the eastern horizon.

- Sunrise. This is the apparent rising of the sun above the horizon.

- Sunset. This is the apparent descent of the sun below the horizon.

- End Evening Civil Twilight (EECT). EECT is the time period when the sun has dropped 6 degrees beneath the western horizon; it is the instant at which there is no longer sufficient light to see objects with the unaided eye.

- End Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT). EENT occurs when the sun has dropped 12 degrees below the western horizon, and is the instant of last available daylight for the visual control of limited ground operations. At EENT, there is no further sunlight available.

- Moonrise. This is the time at which the moon first rises above the horizon. The rising times are dependent on latitude.

- Moonset. This is the time at which the moon sets below the horizon. The setting times are dependent on latitude.

3-9. **Wind** of sufficient speed from any direction can reduce the combat effectiveness of a force as a result of blowing dust, smoke, sand, or precipitation. Strong winds and wind turbulence limit airborne, air assault, and aviation operations. High winds near the ground can lower visibility

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due to blowing dust; they also can affect movement or stability of some vehicles. Wind-generated blowing sand, dust, rain, or snow can reduce the effectiveness or stability of radars, antennas, communications, and other electronic devices. Evaluation of weather in support of operations requires information on the wind at the surface as well as at varying altitudes.

3-10. **Precipitation** is any moisture falling from a cloud in frozen or liquid form. Rain, snow, hail, drizzle, sleet, and freezing rain are common types. Precipitation affects soil trafficability, visibility, and the functioning of many electro-optical systems. Heavy precipitation can have an effect on logistics, communications, personnel, military operations, and many civilian activities.

3-11. **Cloud Cover** affects ground operations by limiting illumination and could affect the thermal signature of targets. Heavy cloud cover can degrade many ISR and target acquisition systems and general aviation operations. Conversely, low cloud cover may increase the available level of light when there is ground-based light, such as what is available in urban areas.

3-12. **Temperature** extremes can reduce effectiveness of troops and equipment capabilities. They may affect the timing of combat operations. For example, extremely high temperatures in a desert environment may require dismounted troops to operate at night.

3-13. **Humidity** is the state of the atmosphere with respect to water vapor content. Automated sensors are often inaccurate above 90 percent relative humidity and under 20 percent relative humidity. Smart weapons require humidity measurements. High humidity affects the human body's ability to cool off. Hence, troops in tropical areas may become less effective because of higher humidity levels. Humidity is usually expressed as—

- Relative humidity. This is the ratio between the air's water content and the water content of the saturated air.

- Absolute humidity. This is the measure of the total water content in the air. It is high in the tropical ocean areas and low in the artic regions.

Additional Weather Considerations

3-14. **Thermal Crossover**, which is an additional weather consideration, has been defined as a natural phenomenon, which normally occurs twice daily when temperature conditions are such that there is a loss of thermal contrast between two adjacent objects. Temperature of targets and objects on the battlefield at night are important for the use of thermal sights and forward-looking infrared (FLIR). A difference in temperature or thermal contrast is required for these devices to "see" a target. Time of thermal crossover may last only a few seconds when the morning sun strikes a target, or several minutes on cloudy adverse weather days; this depends on the threshold temperature contrast required by the thermal device. The SWO can provide tactical decision aids that can be used to predict these temperature differences for planners and estimate length of thermal crossover periods.

3-15. Weather has both direct and indirect effects on military operations. The following are examples of direct effects and indirect effects on military operations:

- Temperature inversions might cause some BPs to be more at risk to the effects of chemical agents.

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- Local visibility, such as fog, can have an effect on observation for both friendly and enemy forces.

- Hot, dry weather might force friendly and enemy forces to consider water sources as key terrain.

3-16. An effective technique for evaluating and depicting weather's direct and indirect effects is to modify terrain analysis products to show the effects of weather considerations. Remember to revise the effects of weather upon terrain analysis as the weather changes from the originally evaluated conditions. Evaluate the weather's direct effects on all facets of METT-TC factors, including facilities, personnel, equipment, and operations.

3-17. Weather effects are harder to depict graphically and may have to be portrayed in a matrix. Whatever means of presentation is used, ensure the focus is on the effects of weather on military operations rather than on the factors that make up the analysis. For example, a commander is less likely to know how much rain will fall over a given period, as he will be more interested in what effect the rain will have on his ability to provide stability and to improve certain public services within his AO. The supporting USAF weather team can assist when seeking detailed information concerning weather and its effects on operations.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

3-18. Terrain analysis is the study and interpretation of natural and manmade features of an area, their effects on military operations, and the effect of weather and climate on these features. Terrain analysis is a continuous process. Changes in the battlefield environment may change the analysis of its effect on the operation or enemy COA.

3-19. The best terrain analysis is based on a reconnaissance of the AO and AOI. Identify gaps in knowledge of the terrain, which a map or imagery analysis cannot satisfy. Use those identified gaps as a guide for reconnaissance planning. If there are time constraints, focus the reconnaissance on the areas most important to the commander and his mission. It is likely that the tasking for a terrain reconnaissance occurs during the mission analysis phase of the MDMP.

3-20. The topographic engineer elements that support divisions, corps, and EAC can conduct the major portion of the terrain analysis, combining extensive database information with the results of reconnaissance. The engineers work closely with the USAF weather detachment or SWO to incorporate the effects of current and projected weather conditions into their terrain analysis. Topographic engineers have access to special terrain databases, such as those produced by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), allowing automated support of the terrain analysis process. Automated terrain software, and to a limited extent an all-source analysis system (ASAS), offers 2-dimensional or 3-dimensional terrain analysis capabilities. You should supplement these databases with a physical (leader's) reconnaissance of the terrain in question when feasible. The automated terrain programs address but are not limited to such factors as—

- Cross-country mobility.

- Transportation systems.

- LOCs.

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- Vegetation type and distribution.
- Surface drainage and configuration.
- Surface materials.
- Substrate materials.
- Obstacles.
- Infrastructures.
- Flood zones.

3-21. Ensure that the terrain analysis includes the effects of weather on the terrain. Consider the existing situation as well as conditions forecasted to occur during mission execution. Express the results of evaluating the terrain's effects by identifying areas of the battlefield that favor, disfavor, or do not affect each COA. Drawing conclusions about the terrain will help the staff evaluate the terrain for places best suited for use as—

- Engagement areas directed against aerial and ground targets.
- Battle positions.
- Infiltration routes.
- Exfiltration routes.
- Avenues of approach.
- Specific system or asset locations.
- Observation posts.
- Ambush sites or positions.

3-22. Conclusions about the effects of terrain are reached through two substeps:

- Analyze the military aspects of the terrain.
- Evaluate the terrain's effect on military operations.

Analyze the Military Aspects of the Terrain

3-23. Terrain analysis is the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors to predict the effects of the terrain on military operations. Evaluate the military aspects of terrain in the order that best supports METT-TC factors. The military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenue of approach (OCOKA), which is usually briefed at the tactical level as OAKOC (observation and

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fields of fire, avenue of approach, key terrain, obstacles, concealment and cover (OAKOC)—are not discussed below in order of importance.

Observation and Fields of Fire

3-24. Observation is the condition of weather and terrain that permits a force to see the friendly, enemy, and neutral personnel and systems, and key aspects of the environment. Commanders evaluate their observation capabilities for electronic and optical line of sight surveillance systems, as well as for unaided visual observation. The highest terrain normally provides the best observation. For this reason, elevated terrain often draws enemy attention. A field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively from a given position (JP 1-02). A unit's field of fire is directly related to its ability to observe. Evaluation of observation and fields of fire identifies—

- Potential engagement areas.
- Defensible terrain and specific equipment or equipment positions.
- Areas where friendly forces are most vulnerable to observation and fires.
- Areas of visual dead space.

3-25. There are limitations on observation caused by relative, localized, and often subtle variations in terrain elevations. The limitations are known as intervisibility lines. When conducting a map reconnaissance, intervisibility lines are identified by locating high points on the terrain. The high points can be plotted on an overlay or map. Sometimes intervisibility lines are not discernible on a map. In that situation, ground reconnaissance must be performed or automated terrain databases can assist in identifying the intervisibility lines.

3-26. Intervisibility is the condition of being able to see one point from the other. This condition may be altered or interrupted by adverse weather, dusk, terrain masking, and smoke. Line of sight is an unobstructed path from a soldier's weapon, weapon sight, electronic sending and receiving antennas, or reconnaissance equipment from one point to another. An analysis of intervisibility has a bearing on line of sight of direct fire weapons, antennas, reconnaissance, and some electro-optical systems.

3-27. There is a close relationship between intervisibility lines and lines of sight. Intervisibility lines can be explained as the overall concept. A line of sight is intervisibility applied to two points. Observation is line of sight applied to one point in relation to all other points. Fields of fire is observation limited to a specific linear distance. Analyze any factors limiting observation and fields of fire. An effective technique is to produce a graphic that displays observation and fields of fire.

3-28. The use of computer generated terrain applications can assist in producing observation and fields of fire graphics. An ideal fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons is an open field in which the enemy can be seen and has no protection from fires. For indirect fire weapons, identify features of terrain that allow good observation. Determine if the terrain has any effect on the trajectory of munitions or elevation of the tube. (See Figures 3-1 and 3-2.)

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

COMMENT: An observer at position "A" can see up slope to position "B," but the ridgeline prevents him from seeing position "C" and vice versa. Whatever you cannot see becomes visual dead space. An observer at position "B" can see positions "A" and "C" because he is at the Intervisibility Line.

Figure 3-1. Example of Observation and Visual Dead Space.



Figure 3-2. Intervisibility Line.

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Avenue of Approach

3-29. An AA is an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. The identification of AAs is important because all COAs which involve maneuver depend on available AAs. During offensive operations, the evaluation of AAs leads to a recommendation on the best AA to a command's objective and identification of avenues available to the enemy for counterattack, withdrawal, or the movement of reinforcements or reserves. In a defense operation, identify AAs that support the enemy's offensive capabilities and avenues that support the movement and commitment of friendly reserves. To develop AAs use the results developed during obstacle evaluation to—

- Identify mobility corridors. The mobility corridor itself is relatively free of obstacles and allows a force to capitalize on the principles of mass and speed. Identifying mobility corridors requires some knowledge of friendly and enemy organizations and their preferred tactics. The best mobility corridors use unrestricted terrain that provided enough space for a force to move in its preferred doctrinal formations while avoiding major obstacles. Mobility corridors can follow, for example, the direction of roads, trails, rivers, streams, ridgelines, subway lines, foot paths, tunnels, and man-sized drainage ditches. Factors other than obstacles and mobility may have to be evaluated when identifying mobility corridors. Mobility corridors, like obstacles, are a function of the type and mobility of the force being evaluated. Traditional military forces, such as mechanized infantry or armored units, require large open areas in which to move and manuever. Insurgents and terrorist elements are less impacted by the presence of obstacles and terrain that would hinder movement of a large formation. The size of a mobility corridor can be determined based on terrain constrictions.

- Categorize mobility corridors. Once the mobility corridors have been identified, categorize them by size or type of force they will accommodate. You may prioritize them in order of likely use if warranted. For example, a mechanized force requires logistical sustainment; a mobility corridor through unrestricted terrain supported by a road network is generally more desirable. A dismounted force might be able to use more restrictive corridors associated with the arctic tundra, swamps or marshes, jungles, or mountains that may or may not have a road network.

- Group mobility corridors to form AAs. Mobility corridors are grouped to form AAs. Unlike mobility corridors, AAs may include areas of severely restricted terrain since they show only the general area through which a force can move.

- Evaluate AAs. The evaluation is a combined effort of the entire staff. Evaluating AAs identifies those which best support enemy and/or friendly capabilities. Prioritize the AA based on how well each supports the enemy's ability to meet the desired end state in a timely and efficient manner. AAs are evaluated for suitability in terms of—

  - Access to key terrain and adjacent avenues.

  - Degree of canalization and ease of movement.

  - Use of the military aspect of terrain (OAKOC) in accordance with METT-TC factors.

  - Sustainability (LOC support).

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- Access to the objective.

Key Terrain

3-30. Key terrain is any locality or area whose seizure, retention, or control affords a marked advantage to either combatant. In an urban environment, key terrain can be such things as tall structures, choke points, and intersections. High ground can be key terrain because it dominates an area with good observation and fields of fire. In an open or arid environment, a draw or wadi could be viewed as key terrain. Tactical use of terrain is often directed at increasing the capability for applying combat power and at the same time forcing the enemy into areas in order to reduce his ability to apply combat power. Decisive terrain is key terrain that has an extraordinary impact on the mission. The successful accomplishment of the mission depends on seizing, retaining, or denying the terrain to the enemy. It needs to be understood that key terrain is not necessarily decisive terrain. The commander designates decisive terrain to communicate to his staff and subordinate commanders how important that terrain is to his concept of operation.

Obstacles

3-31. An obstacle is any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of any threat, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the threat. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of both. Some examples of obstacles to ground mobility are buildings, mountains, steep slopes, dense forests, rivers, lakes, urban areas, minefields, trenches, certain religious and cultural sites, and wire obstacles (concertina wire, barb wire).

3-32. Obstacles could affect certain types of movement differently. As an example, obstacles such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dense forested areas, road craters, rubble in the streets, or densely populated urban areas may have a greater effect on mounted movement than on dismounted movement. Minefields, concertina, or steep slopes may be more effective against dismounted movement. Obstacles to air mobility include terrain features that exceed the aircraft's service ceiling, restrict nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight, or that force the aircraft to employ a particular flight profile. Examples would be tall buildings (skyscrapers), cellular telephone towers, telephone and power lines, rapidly rising terrain features, mountains, smoke, and other obscurants. High mountainous regions can impact the ability of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft to loiter over targets as well as their lift capabilities.

3-33. Other types of obstacles that could affect mounted and dismounted operations are alarms, anti-intrusion devices, tripwires. An evaluation of obstacles leads to the identification of mobility corridors. This in turn helps identify defensible terrain and AAs. In order to properly evaluate obstacles—
:

- Identify pertinent obstacles in the AOI.
- Determine the effect of each obstacle on the mobility of the evaluated force.
- Combine the effect of individual obstacles into an integrated product such as the MCOO.

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3-34. If NGA products or topographic engineer support are unavailable, and time and resources permit, prepare terrain factor overlays to aid in evaluating obstacles. Some of the factors to consider are—

- Vegetation (type, tree spacing and trunk diameter).
- Surface drainage (stream width, depth, velocity, bank slope, and height).
- Surface materials (soil types and conditions that affect mobility).
- Surface configuration (elevation, slopes that affect mobility, line of sight for equipment usage).
- Obstacles (natural and manmade); consider obstacles to flight as well as ground mobility).
- Transportation systems (bridge classification and road characteristics such as curve radius, slopes, and width).
- Effects of actual or projected weather such as heavy precipitation or snow cover.

3-35. Combine the several factor overlays into a single product known as the combined obstacle overlay. These overlays integrate the evaluations of the various factors into a single product known as the MCOO that depicts the battlefield's effects on mobility.

3-36. The MCOO provides the basis for identifying air and ground AA and mobility corridors. It integrates all obstacles to movement including but not limited to built-up areas, slope, soil, vegetation, and transportation systems (bridge classification, road characteristics) into one overlay. It is important that the MCOO be tailored to operational METT-TC factors. It is a collaborative effort involving input from the entire staff. The MCOO depicts the terrain as severely restricted, restricted, and unrestricted. IPB defines severely restricted, restricted, and unrestricted as follows:

- *Severely restricted* terrain severely hinders or slows movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. This could take the form of committing engineer assets to improving mobility or of deviating from doctrinal tactics, such as moving in columns instead of line formations or at speeds much lower than those preferred. Severely restricted terrain for armored and mechanized forces is typically characterized by steep slopes and large or densely spaced obstacles with little or no supporting roads. A common technique is to depict this type of severely restricted terrain on overlays and sketches by marking the areas with cross-hatched diagonal lines.
- *Restricted* terrain hinders movement to some degree. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units may have difficulty maintaining preferred speeds, moving in combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another. Restricted terrain slows movement by requiring zig-zagging or frequent detours. Restricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces typically consists of moderate to steep slopes or moderate to densely spaced obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings. Swamps or rugged terrain are examples of restricted terrain for dismounted infantry forces. Logistical or rear area

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movement may be supported by poorly developed road systems. A common and useful technique is to depict restricted terrain on overlays and sketches by marking the areas with diagonal lines.

- *Unrestricted* terrain is free of any restriction to movement. Nothing needs to be done to enhance mobility. Unrestricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces is typically flat to moderately sloping terrain with scattered or widely spaced obstacles such as trees or rocks. Unrestricted terrain allows wide maneuver by the forces under consideration and unlimited travel supported by well developed road networks.

3-37. Terrain mobility classifications are not absolute but reflect the relative effect of terrain on the threat's preferred maneuver formation and techniques, as well as for our task organization. They are based on the ability of a force to maneuver in combat formations or to transition from one type formation to another. Consider the following:

- Obstacles are more effective if they are covered by observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may canalize an attacker into concentrations, which are easier to detect and target or defend against.

- When evaluating the terrain's effect on more than one type of organization (for example, motorized or dismounted), the obstacle overlays should reflect the mobility of the particular force.

- The cumulative effects of individual obstacles in the final evaluation. For example, individually a gentle slope or a moderately dense forest may prove to be an unrestrictive obstacle to vehicular traffic. Taken together, the combination may prove to be restrictive.

- Account for the weather's effects on factors that affect mobility.

- Keep in mind that the classification of terrain into various obstacle types reflects only its relative impact on force mobility. There are many examples of a force achieving surprise by negotiating supposedly "impassable" terrain. Remember that the terrain classifications are not absolute.

Cover and Concealment

3-38. Cover is physical protection from bullets, fragments of exploding rounds, flame, nuclear effects, and biological and chemical agents. Cover and concealment can be provided by but are not limited to ditches, caves, riverbanks, and folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, and embankments. Cover does not necessarily provide concealment. An example of cover without concealment is a bunker in plain sight that is intended for the protection of personnel.

3-39. Concealment is protection from observation. It denies the enemy the ability to observe forces, equipment, or position. Trees, underbrush, snow, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, as well as manmade camouflage, can provide concealment. Concealment does not necessarily provide cover.

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Evaluate the Terrain's Effect on Military Operations

3-40. The analyst must relate the analysis to the terrain's effects on the COA available to enemy and friendly forces. During the evaluation it is important to discuss the military aspects of terrain in great detail.

3-41. There are four basic techniques to evaluate the terrain's effect on COAs.

- *Concentric Ring Technique.* This technique establishes concentric rings around US forces starting from the unit's base of operation and working out. Each ring is balanced and based on the enemy environment and the commander's need to develop his knowledge of the tactical situation. Once a certain information collection ring is in place, it is not abandoned; however, the focus of the evaluation is to expand and establish a second ring. (See Figure 3-3.)



Figure 3-3. Concentric Ring Technique.

- *Belt Technique.* This technique divides the AO in belts (areas) running the width of the AO. The shape of the belt is based on METT-TC analysis. The belt technique is most effective when terrain is divided into well-defined cross-compartments during phased operations (such as river crossings, air assault, or airborne operations) or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined belts. Belts can be adjacent to or even overlap each other. (See Figure 3-4.)

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

Figure 3-4. Belt Technique.

- *Avenue-In-Depth Technique.* This technique focuses on one AA. It is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalized terrain inhibits mutual support. (See Figure 3-5.)



Figure 3-5. Avenue-In-Depth Technique.

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- *Box Technique.* This technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an engagement area, a river crossing site, or an LZ. It is most useful when time is constrained and is particularly useful when conducting operations in a noncontiguous AO. (See Figure 3-6.)



Figure 3-6. Box Technique.

3-42. When properly applied the techniques will aid in identifying the areas for use as potential—

- Engagement areas and ambush sites. Using the results from the evaluation of cover and concealment, identify areas where the force is vulnerable to enemy fires. If the command is attacking, these are areas where friendly forces will be vulnerable to enemy fires. If the command is defending, these are potential engagement areas.

- Battle positions. Identify concealed and covered positions that offer observation and fields of fire into potential engagement areas. If the command is defending, they are potential defensive positions. If the command is attacking, they provide a start point for determining possible enemy COAs. These BPs might also be used by friendly attacking forces to block enemy counterattacks.

- Immediate or intermediate objectives. Identify any areas or terrain features that dominate the AAs or assigned objective areas. These objectives will usually correspond to areas already identified as key terrain.

3-43. The terrain rarely favors one type of operation throughout the width and breadth of the battlefield. Within a given area certain subsectors will affect various operations to varying degrees. Based on the location and nature of potential engagement areas, BPs, and objectives,

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determine which areas of the battlefield favor each COA. The following are useful tools for disseminating the results of terrain analysis:

- The analysis of the AO.
- Intelligence estimate.
- MCOO.
- Other graphic products.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

3-44. This step of describing the battlefield's effects includes all aspects of the battlefield environment that affect friendly and enemy COA not incorporated into the terrain and weather analysis. Use a two-step process to determine the effects of other characteristics of the battlefield:

- Analyze other characteristics of the battlefield.
- Evaluate the effects of other characteristics of the battlefield on military operations.

Analyze Other Characteristics of the Battlefield

3-45. Other characteristics of the battlefield vary greatly with each circumstance; thus, a comprehensive list cannot be provided. However, depending on the situation, the following characteristic could appear on the battlefield:

- *Society (Social-Cultural).* To effectively operate among the various population groups and maintain their goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure. US forces can avoid losing local support for the mission and anticipate local reaction to friendly COAs by understanding, respecting, and following local customs when possible. Accommodating the social norms of a population group is potentially the most influential factor in the conduct of operations, especially in the urban environment.
- *Population*. A population group may be significant as a threat, an obstacle, a logistical support problem, or a source of information and support. The impact of the population on operations and missions is often greater than the terrain. During the IPB process, it is important to analyze population density; population concentrations by racial, linguistic, and cultural distinctions; living conditions; political grievances and affiliations; and education levels as well as attitudes towards friendly and enemy forces.
- *Economics*. Consider the principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations and the economic infrastructure. It would beneficial to understand such factors as a country's gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, current value of money and wage scales, its financial structure, natural resources, domestic and foreign indebtedness, and last but not least black market activities and illicit trades.

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- *Politics*. Understand the formal political structure (democracy, dictatorship) of the government and it sources of power. The analyst needs to observe and analyze acceptance by the populace of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems, the type and level of violence exhibited by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups that support or oppose the use of violence. What are the legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success? What is the integrity of the political process? Identify the role of the populace, regularity of elections, any systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocks, and patron-client determinants of voting.

- *Infrastructure*. Military planners need to understand the infrastructure upon which the population depends. A force that controls the water, electricity, telecommunications, fuel supplies (wood, coal, oil, natural gas), food production, processing and distribution, waste disposal, police, and medical facilities virtually controls the area, especially in an urban area. A city's infrastructure is its foundation. It includes buildings, bridges, roads, airfields, ports, subways, sewers, power plants, industrial sectors, and similar physical structures. To understand how the infrastructure of a city supports the population, it needs to be viewed as a system of systems. Each component affects the population, the normal operation of the city, and the potential long-term success of military operations. By determining the critical infrastructure nodes and their vulnerabilities, planners can delineate locations where the enemy may attack.

- *Transportation*. The transportation network includes roads, railways, subways, bus systems, airports, and harbors. In developing environments the primary means of transportation may be food traffic, livestock, and/or bicycles. Detailed knowledge and a thorough understanding of the transportation nodes is needed in order to prevent possible repercussions on military operations, such as alienating a friendly or neutral populace.

- *Communications*. Complicated networks of landlines, radio relay stations, fiber optics, cellular service, and the Internet provide a vast web of communications capabilities. This communications redundancy allows for the constant flow of information. Developing countries may have little in the way of communications infrastructure. Information may flow by less sophisticated means—couriers, graffiti, rumors or gossiping, and local print media. Understanding whatever communication infrastructure exists is important because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and the enemy.

Evaluate the Effects of Other Significant Characteristics of the Battlefield on Military Operations

3-46. As with weather and terrain, the evaluation of the other significant characteristics is not complete until they are expressed in terms of their effect on friendly and enemy COAs. In some situations, the other significant characteristics are of more concern than weather and terrain. They play a critical role at the tactical level and are important at the operational and strategic levels. For example, an intelligence officer may report that a religious activity occurring on Wednesday will make search operations difficult to execute because most of the local populace will be praying at the time of the scheduled search.

3-47. In evaluating any given population group (urban), military planners must recognize that a population group will behave in a manner consistent with their own self-interests. The population group will be aware of other interests at work, such as those of US forces, those of

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hostile elements (terrorist), those of local "opportunist (criminals)," and those of other population groups. For example, a US convoy traveling through an urban area comes under fire from unknown hostile elements. While the convoy is under attack the local populace is going about its daily activities. The locals must decide whether it is in their best interest to provide assistance to the US forces, support the hostile elements, or try to remain neutral. These various interest groups are constantly sized up by the population in order to ascertain their own stakes, risks, and payoffs.

DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON ENEMY AND FRIENDLY CAPABILITIES AND COURSES OF ACTION

3-48. Combine the evaluation of the effects of terrain, weather, and other characteristics of the battlefield into a product that best suits your commander's requirements. Do not focus on the preconceptions that lead to conclusions. Instead, focus on the total environment's effects on COAs available to both friendly and enemy forces. It is necessary to coordinate with other battle staff officers in order to evaluate the battlefield's effect on friendly COAs.

3-49. Ensure the evaluation on the effects of the battlefield environment is on specific enemy COAs. An effective technique is to role-play the enemy's G2/S2 and G3/S3, simulating the development and recommendation of a set of COAs to their commander. Present the conclusions from the description of the battlefield environment in written reports that best suit your commander's requirements. Disseminate graphic products developed during the analysis and evaluation as needed in order to support the remainder of the staff and other commands in their own IPB and planning efforts.

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Chapter 4

EVALUATE THE THREAT

4-1. The US Army must be ready to evaluate threats employing varying combinations of technology and challenging us at varying levels of intensity. In stability operations and support operations the threat may be military forces, paramilitary, or small-cell oriented terrorist organizations. The definition of the force structure and function will be vital to evaluation of capabilities and expected level of activity. Not all enemies are purely military in nature. No matter who the enemy is, it is still important to portray as accurately as possible how they normally execute operations, how they have executed operations in the past, and what they are capable of doing given the current situation.

4-2. If the staff fails to determine all the threat factions involved or their capabilities or equipment, understand their doctrine and TTP as well as their history, the following is likely to occur:

- The staff will lack the intelligence needed for planning.
- The enemy will surprise friendly forces with capabilities the staff failed to account for.
- The staff will waste time and effort analyzing against enemy capabilities that do not exist.
- The staff will fail to see or consider the enemy as thinking and adaptive.

4-3. There are two steps in the threat evaluation process:

- Update or Create Threat Models:
  - Convert enemy doctrine or patterns of operation to graphics (doctrinal template).
  - Describe the enemy's tactics and options.
  - Identify HVTs.
- Identify Threat Capabilities.

4-4. There is no such thing as an enemy that cannot be "templated," at least in some form. Enemy doctrine may be rudimentary or even nonexistent; however, in virtually all cases an opposing force will at some level of command act according to some set of ad hoc or established procedures. For example, friendly forces found a training manual belonging to a major terrorist organization.

UPDATE OR CREATE THREAT MODELS

4-5. Creating or updating a threat model allows the analyst to piece together information, identify gaps, predict threat activities or COAs, and plan ISR. There will always be information gaps in the threat model; therefore, the analyst will have some degree of uncertainty. By comparing an existing model to current activity, the analyst can identify patterns, trends, and

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activity levels. When considering a new or emerging threat, the analyst can develop a new model.

4-6. Threat models consist of three parts:

- Doctrinal templates.
- Descriptions of preferred tactics and options.
- Identification of HVTs.

4-7. In order to fill in the information gap and lessen the degree of uncertainty, information flows from top to bottom as well as from bottom to top. All information collected by subordinate elements, such as patrols or others in contact with locals, needs to be reported in a timely manner to the unit S2. The information contained in patrol reports and debriefs can provide important details on the threat when provided to an analyst and will allow for a more detailed and realistic threat model.

DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES

4-8. Doctrinal templates graphically portray the deployment patterns and dispositions preferred by enemy forces when not constrained by the effects of the operational environment. Doctrinal templates are scaled to depict the enemy's disposition for a particular type of operation (for example, offense, defense, movement to contact, insurgent ambush, or terrorist kidnapping operation). When possible, templates should be depicted graphically as an overlay, on a supporting intelligence system, or through some other means. Doctrinal templates are tailored to the needs of the unit or staff creating them; they may depict but are not limited to unit frontages, unit depths, boundaries, engagement areas, and obstacles.

4-9. Construct doctrinal templates through an analysis of the intelligence database and an evaluation of the enemy's past operations. Determine how the enemy normally organizes for combat and how he deploys and employs his forces and assets. Look for patterns in how the enemy organizes his forces, timing, distances, relative locations, groupings, or use of the terrain and weather. Unconventional operations lend themselves to graphic depiction, such as—

- The methodology and technique an insurgent force will use to emplace and explode an IED along convoy routes.
- The methods used by a criminal organization to rob banks.
- Convoy procedures a drug trafficking ring will use to transport large amounts of drugs, such as the distance between vehicles, number of vehicles, where security forces are placed, and how many are in the convoy.
- How the security force will react to or deploy against a police force.

4-10. Templating requires continuous refinement to accurately portray threat patterns and practices. For example, there is no doctrinal template for emplacement of cocaine laboratories. Evaluating the database can indicate a specific amount of time and the chemicals needed to process cocaine. Because the process time is a consistent planning factor, an analyst can use

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the processing time evaluation to convey likely distribution times. An analyst can develop laboratory profiles and templates by combining previously identified drug laboratory sites with production processes, growing seasons, and other factors.

4-11. Doctrinal templates are tailored to the needs of the unit or staff section creating them. A G2 section's doctrinal template will differ in scope from the template created by a brigade S2 section. Some doctrinal templates consider the enemy forces as a whole, while others focus on a single BOS, such as intelligence or FS. Figure 4-1 shows an example of a doctrinal template using urban environment.



Figure 4-1. Doctrinal Templates Using an Urban Environment.

DESCRIPTIONS OF PREFERRED TACTICS AND OPTIONS

4-12. The threat model includes a description of the enemy's preferred tactics. A description is still needed even if the enemy's preferred tactics are depicted in a graphic form. The description—

- Lists the options available to the enemy should the operation fail or succeed.
- Prevents the threat model from becoming more than a "snapshot in time" of the operation being depicted.
- Aids in mentally wargaming the operation over its duration and during the development of enemy COAs and situation templates.
- Addresses typical timelines and phases of operation, points where units transition from one form of maneuver to the next, and how each BOS contributes to the success of the operation.

4-13. Describe the actions of the supporting BOS in enough detail to allow for identification and development of HVTs. Examine each phase separately because target values may change from phase to phase.

IDENTIFICATION OF HVTS

4-14. Those assets required for the successful completion of the enemy commander's mission are defined as HVTs. The following techniques may be useful in identifying and evaluating HVTs:

- Identify HVTs from existing intelligence studies; evaluation of the databases; patrol debriefs; and size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) reports. A review of enemy TTP and previous enemy operations as well as understanding the enemy's objective, tasks, purpose, and the enemy commander's intent will be useful.
- Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation. Identify assets that are key to satisfying decision criteria or initial adoption of branches and sequels.
- Determine how the enemy might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the enemy's ability to substitute other assets as well as the adoption of branches or sequels.

4-15. After identifying the set of HVTs, place them in order of their relative worth to the enemy's operation and record them as part of the threat model. An HVT's value will vary over the course of an operation. Identify changes in value by phase of operation and annotate them. The following are additional considerations:

- Use all available intelligence sources (for example, patrol debriefs, SALUTE reports) to update and refine the threat models.
- Categorize the updates to allow you to reach a conclusion concerning the enemy's operations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

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IDENTIFY THREAT CAPABILITIES

4-16. Threat capabilities are COAs and supporting operations which the enemy can take to influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Define the capabilities with the use of statements. The following are examples of capability statements:

- "The enemy has the capability to attack with up to 8 divisions supported by 150 daily sorties of fixed-wing aircraft."
- "The criminal organization has the ability to pay off local law enforcement agencies."
- "The terrorists have the capability to send destructive viruses over the Internet, which can destroy computer files and archives."
- "The enemy can establish a prepared defense by 14 May."
- "The terrorists have the capability of using CBRNE."
- "The drug smugglers have the ability to conduct three drug-smuggling operations at the same time."
- "The terrorists have the ability to conduct multiple car bombings simultaneously."
- "The enemy has the ability to target friendly convoys along main supply routes using remotely detonated IEDs."

4-17. Other capabilities include support to COAs (attack, defend, reinforce, retrograde) or specific type of operations as well as operations that would allow the enemy force to use a COA that would not normally be available to him or would be severely hindered if the supporting operation were not conducted. Examples of these types of operations include—

- Use of NBC weapons.
- Intelligence collection.
- Electronic Warfare (EW) operations.
- Use of air assets (fixed and rotary).
- Engineering operations.
- Air assault or airborne operations.
- Amphibious operations.
- River operations.
- Psychological operations (PSYOP).

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- Deception operations.
- Car bombings, bomb scares, and suicide bombers.
- Raids on weapon storage facilities.
- Carjacking or hijacking of vehicles used in transporting personnel, weapons, and/or drugs.
- Theft of chemicals related to drug manufacturing.

4-18. When identifying enemy capabilities and COAs, start with a full set of threat models and consider the threat's ability to conduct each operation based on the current situation and his own METT-TC conditions. Most situations will not present the enemy with ideal conditions envisioned by his doctrine. As a result, the enemy's actual capabilities usually will not mirror the ideal capabilities represented by the complete set of threat models.

4-19. The enemy could be under strength in personnel and equipment, may be short of logistical support, or the soldiers or other personnel may be inexperienced or poorly trained. As a result, the enemy's actual capabilities usually will not mirror the ideal capabilities represented by the complete set of threat models. For example, a terrorist group's normal tactics may call for the use of car bombs as a diversionary tactic in order to conduct other operations elsewhere. Your evaluation of the enemy's logistics might indicate a critical shortage of explosives. The following are additional considerations:

- Do not limit the threat models and capabilities strictly to the enemy's conventional forces. For example, student rioters during a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) may be or may become a threat during the operation.
- Do not blow up or increase the threat model and threat capabilities. The proper use of findings and recommendations developed from threat assessments will in turn develop realistic threat models.
- During any discussion of the threat, cultural awareness is an important factor to consider. By developing an awareness of the culture, friendly units can identify groups or individual members of the population that may be friendly, a threat, somewhere in between, or both.

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Chapter 5

DETERMINE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

5-1. The final step of the IPB process is to determine the various enemy COAs. A detailed analysis will enable the staff to—

- Replicate the set of COAs that the enemy is considering.
- Identify all COAs that will influence the friendly mission.
- Identify those areas and activities that, when collected, will indicate which COA the enemy has chosen.

5-2. The staff will use enemy COAs, along with other facts and assumptions about the battlefield environment, to drive the COA analysis (wargaming) process and thus influence friendly COA development. Determine enemy COAs using the following five steps:

- Identify the enemy's likely objectives and desired end state.
- Identify the full set of COAs available to the enemy.
- Evaluate and prioritize each COA.
- Develop each COA in the amount of detail required and time allows.
- Identify initial ISR requirements.

IDENTIFY THE ENEMY'S LIKELY OBJECTIVES AND DESIRED END STATE

5-3. Based on METT-TC factors, the commander specifies the level (for example, echelon or cell) to depict the enemy. At a minimum, the staff determines likely objectives and desired end state. Against a conventional threat the analysis should start at more than one level above the friendly echelon unit and work down. In an asymmetrical environment the analysis should start as low as possible.

5-4. The potential threat involves terrorists, criminal organizations, or third-party actors. Look at groups, cells, and individual elements; and evaluate propaganda, graffiti, and gang symbols in order to determine the likely objectives and desired end state. Also consider more than conventional objectives such as capture of terrain or destruction of friendly forces as enemy COAs. Political, social, and economic objectives can be as important as military objectives and can have a direct influence on the enemy COAs.

5-5. Have a thorough understanding of the enemy and know how they have conducted previous operations. How they have conducted previous operations can provide insights into possible objectives and the desired end state.

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IDENTIFY THE FULL SET OF COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY

5-6. To ensure that the full set of available enemy COAs was identified, the staff should consider the following:

- The enemy COAs that the enemy believes are appropriate to the current situation and the identification of the enemy's likely objectives. This requires an understanding of the enemy's decisionmaking process as well as an appreciation for how the enemy perceives the current situation.
- The enemy COAs which could significantly influence your unit's mission; for example, diverting combat power to cover increasing force protection requirements.
- The enemy COAs that may go outside the boundaries of known enemy doctrine or TTP, especially if the known threat is a individual terrorist or a terrorist cell or group.
- The enemy COAs indicated by recent activities and events. To avoid surprise from an unanticipated COA, consider all possible explanations for the enemy's activity in terms of possible enemy COAs.

5-7. Ensure that the enemy COAs are distinct and evaluate each based on its effect on the friendly mission and force protection. Compare the consolidated list of enemy capabilities you identified in Step 3 of the IPB process (Evaluate the Threat) and eliminate any COAs which the enemy is incapable of executing.

5-8. Based on the evaluation of the enemy's capabilities, select a threat model that has the potential to accomplish the enemy's likely objectives. Examine how the effects of the battlefield will influence the enemy's applications of its COAs. You will usually find the terrain, weather, and other characteristics of the operational environment "offer" a limited set of enemy COAs, encouraging some while discouraging others.

5-9. Start with the general COAs open to the enemy, such as deliberate attack, defend car bombing, kidnapping. Further, define each general enemy COA as a set of specific enemy COAs by integrating the threat models from Step 3 of the IPB process with the description of the battlefield's effects identified in this step. Consider the following factors when defining the general enemy COAs into specific enemy COAs:

- The enemy's intent or desired end state.
- Likely attack or counterattack objectives.
- Effects of the battlefield environment on operations and COAs.
- Threat vulnerabilities or shortages in logistics or personnel.
- Location of main and supporting efforts.
- Current disposition of forces, groups, cells.
- Enemy perception of friendly forces.

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- Enemy efforts to present an ambiguous situation or achieve surprise.

5-10. Each enemy COA you identify should meet six criteria:

- *Suitability*. An enemy COA must have the potential for accomplishing the enemy's likely objective or end state.

- *Feasibility*. Consider the time and space required to execute the COA. Are they available? Also, consider the resources required to execute the COA. Does the enemy have the physical means to make it a success? Sometimes force ratios and other factors might indicate the enemy lacks the means to accomplish his likely objectives. Before discounting the threat, consider what actions he might take to create the conditions needed for success. For example, would the enemy violate his own doctrine in order to accomplish the objective? What seemly radical measures can he take to create the conditions for success?

- *Acceptability*. Consider the amount of risk involved. Will the enemy accept the amount of risk entailed in adopting the COA? For instance, some terrorist groups are risk adverse, while others will carry out operations regardless of risk. There are, however, factors, which weigh on the amount of risk—risk being defined in an asymmetrical environment as the probability of concluding a successful attack rather than the survival of the attackers; namely, the ability to approach the target area in sufficient strength or with sufficient assets to execute a successful attack. Can the enemy afford the expenditure of resources for an uncertain chance of success? To answer those types of questions requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and his doctrine.

- *Uniqueness*. Each enemy COA must be significantly different from the others. Otherwise, consider it as a variation rather than a distinct COA. Factors to consider in determining if a COA is "significantly" different are the COA's—

  — Effect on the friendly mission.

  — Use of reserves, second echelon, or additional asymmetric threats; for example, terrorist cells or groups.

  — Location of main effort.

  — Scheme of maneuver.

  — Task organization.

- *Consistency with Doctrine.* Each enemy COA must be consistent with the enemy's doctrine. Base the evaluation of consistency on the enemy's written doctrine and observations of his past application of doctrine, previous operations, and deception practices, and knowledge of friendly actions and responses.

- *Flexibility and Adaptability.* Make a judgment based on the demonstrated flexibility and adaptability of the enemy. Consider how the enemy has conducted operations.

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5-11. In developing enemy COAs, the staff must determine the doctrinal requirements for each type of operation it is considering, to include doctrinal tasks to be assigned to subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a breach force, a support force, and an assault force. In addition, enemy COA development must look at possibilities created by attachments (for example, light infantry attached to armored forces opens possibility of air assault).

5-12. Once staff members have explored each enemy COA's possibilities, they can examine each (changing, adding, or eliminating enemy COAs as appropriate) to determine if it satisfies enemy COA selection criteria. The staff must avoid the common pitfall of presenting one good enemy COA among several "throw away" enemy COAs. History repeatedly demonstrates that the enemy often surprises those who predict only one COA.

5-13. Account for the effect of friendly dispositions, or the enemy's perception of friendly dispositions, when determining the COAs the enemy believes are available. A technique for accomplishing this is to conduct "reverse IPB." In other words, replicate the IPB process from the enemy's perspective that the enemy would employ to discern friendly COAs.

EVALUATE AND PRIORITIZE EACH COURSE OF ACTION

5-14. The commander and staff need to develop a plan that is optimized to one of the COAs, while allowing for contingency options should the enemy choose another COA. Therefore, the staff must evaluate each enemy COA and prioritize it according to how likely the enemy will adopt that option. Establish an initial priority list to allow the staff to plan for friendly COAs. Once the commander selects a friendly COA, there may be a need to reorder the list of enemy COAs, especially any changes in the enemy's perception of friendly forces. To prioritize each COA, consider the following:

- Analyze each COA to identify enemy strengths, weaknesses, DPs, and any potential COGs.
- Evaluate how well each COA meets the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, flexibility and adaptability, and consistency with enemy doctrine, their previous operation, and enemy TTP.
- Evaluate how well each COA takes advantage of the battlefield environment. How does the battlefield encourage or discourage selection of each COA?
- Analyze the enemy's recent activity to determine if there are indications that one COA has already been adopted.

5-15. Consider the possibility that the enemy may not choose the predicted COA over another COA. This is a possibility if the enemy has implemented a deception operation.

5-16. Compare each COA to the others and determine if the enemy is more likely to prefer one over the other. Most forces will choose the COA that offers the greatest advantage while minimizing risk. An asymmetrical threat may choose a COA that is the most risky or may select a COA that offers the greatest amount of destruction, or the COA that has the greatest political or psychological impact.

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5-17. Use judgment to rank the enemy COAs in their likely order of adoption. Modify the list as needed to account for changes in the current situation. Friendly dispositions may change as the command moves to adopt its own COA. How will friendly unit movement change the likelihood of each enemy COA?

DEVELOP EACH COURSE OF ACTION IN THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL REQUIRED AND TIME ALLOWS

5-18. Once the complete set of enemy COAs are identified, develop each COA into as much detail as the situation requires and time available allows. To ensure completeness, each COA must answer the following six questions:

- Who — The enemy or threat, its makeup: a conventional force (terrorist organization, group or cell), insurgency, criminal (gang, group, cartel).
- What — The type of operation, such as attack, defend, bank robbery, suicide bombing. In an asymmetrical environment the *what* should factor in target types, target selection, and objectives.
- When — The time the action will begin. *When* usually states this in terms of the earliest time that the enemy can adopt the COA under consideration. In an OE, consider the following factors in determining *when*:
  - Capability.
  - Intent.
  - History.
  - Activity.
  - Target atmospherics and environment.
  - Personalities.
- Where — Sectors, zones, and objectives that makes up the objective. In a terrorist or asymmetrical environment, the *where* would be a terrorist organization's or insurgeny's identified AO (for example, Israel, Philippines, Columbia, Pakistan).
- How — The method by which the enemy will employ his assets, such as dispositions, location of main effort, scheme of maneuver, or time and place of a terrorist attack and how it will be supported.
- Why — The objective or end state the enemy intends to accomplish. The objective or end state of an asymmetrical threat would factor in the vision or mission of that type of threat (for example, purify Islam through violence; overthrow the secular government and replace it with an Islamic State).

5-19. Consider conventional enemy forces available to at least one level of command above and two down from your own when developing each COA. When considering asymmetrical

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enemy COAs, the forces available may range from individual, groups, cells, or elements. Time permitting, the final product should consist of a detailed set of enemy COAs. The degree of specificity or fidelity should be as low as possible. Each developed enemy COA has three parts:

- Situation templates.
- Enemy COAs and options.
- HVTs.

SITUATION TEMPLATE

5-20. This part of the developed enemy COA depicts a potential enemy COA as part of a particular enemy operation. Situation templates are developed on the enemy's current situation (for example, training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, and disposition), the environment, and enemy doctrine or patterns of operations. The commander dictates the level to depict the enemy based on METT-TC factors (at a minimum two levels of command below the friendly force) as a part of his guidance for mission analysis. The following techniques will help to develop a situation template.

- Begin with the threat model (conventional or asymmetric) representing the operation under consideration.
- Overlay the doctrinal template on the products that depict the battlefield's effects on the operation. The product of choice is usually the MCOO, but may vary with the situation.
- Using analytical judgment and knowledge of enemy TTP and doctrine, adjust the dispositions depicted on the doctrinal template to account for the battlefield's effects.
- Check the situation template to account for all the enemy's major assets and functions, and that none have been inadvertently duplicated.
- Ensure that the template reflects the main effort (conventional) or potential multiple targets (asymmetric) identified for the COA. Compare depicted dispositions to the enemy's known doctrine; check for consistency. Although the enemy might not always operate in accordance with their doctrine, consider the enemy's desire to present an ambiguous situation and achieve surprise.
- Include as much detail on the template as time and the situation warrant or allow.
- Ensure the template depicts the locations and activities of the HVTs listed in the threat models.
- Using the description of preferred tactics that accompanies the doctrinal template as a guide, think through the COA's scheme of maneuver. For example, in the operational environment, attempt to visualize a terrorist element transitioning from collection, reconnaissance, and preparation to the actual attack order (by times and phases) on the template.

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- Mentally wargame the scheme of maneuver or scheme of activities from positions or locations depicted on the template through to the COA's success or failure. Identify points where a threat force will transition from one formation into another, potential assembly areas, and likely culminating point or end state. If the enemy is a terrorist, or an insurgency, attempt to visualize how the enemy will transition from collection, reconnaissance, and preparation to the actual attack times and phases on the template. Follow-up by identifying how each BOS "fits in" and supports the operation.

5-21. Against a conventional military threat, evaluate time and space factors to develop time phase lines depicting enemy movement. Base the time phase lines on the enemy's doctrinal rates of movement, with some modifications. Evaluate actual movement rates with written doctrine. Consider the effects of the battlefield environment with movement.

5-22. When placing time phase lines, consider only the time it will take to adopt movement formations, time to conduct movement to the selected location, and time for the unit to close after arrival. This assumes that time-consuming planning, issuance of orders, reconnaissance, and logistical preparations may occur during movement.

5-23. During staff wargaming of the situation templates against potential friendly COAs, update time phase lines to consider when threat movement will be triggered or how they might be influenced by friendly actions. Incorporate results of initial ISR collection efforts into wargame. Against any enemy you should try to overlay as many situation templates as necessary against US and friendly facilities, places, or personnel.

5-24. Prepare as many graphics as necessary to depict the COA in enough detail to support staff wargaming and collection planning. Tailor the situation templates to your needs by focusing on the factors that are important to the commander or mission area. At higher echelons the situation templates will usually focus on culminating points and installations or activities associated with COGs.

5-25. The development of time phase lines may not be practical against a terrorist organization. You may evaluate time and space factors to develop timelines of activities. Timelines are established from observations of previous terrorist actions.

Example: Al-Qaida's attack planning against the US embassies in Dar-Es-Salaam and Nairobi began in 1993. Between 1993 and 1995 reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted. Starting in 1995 logistic sites were activated in both locations as well as in Khartoum, Sudan. During the 1995 timeframe to the actual attack in 1998, the senior terrorist leaders in Afghanistan spoke or met with cell leaders and authorized continued planning, training, and movement of materials and personnel.

5-26. Some situation templates are better presented in a matrix format. Sometimes, other products such as key facilities, target overlays, or terrorist trends overlays replace situation templates. Use whatever technique best graphically illustrates the enemy COAs.

ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION AND OPTIONS

5-27. This part of Step 4 describes the activities of the forces depicted on the situation template. It can range from a narrative description to a detailed synchronization matrix depicting activities of each unit, BOS, or asymmetrical activity in detail. It should address the earliest time the COA

can be executed, timelines and phases associated with the COA, and decisions the enemy commander will make during execution of the COA and after. Use the COA description to support staff wargaming and to develop the event template and supporting indicators.

5-28. Develop the description of the COA into as much detail as time allows and the situation requires. Use whatever tools or techniques best satisfy your needs. For example, you might use a time event chart or a simple narrative description. Regardless of the form initially chosen, the COA statement will be refined to greater detail during the wargaming of potential friendly COAs.

5-29. The following will help to describe enemy COAs and options.

- Describe preferred tactics that accompany the doctrinal template.
- As you mentally wargame the situation template, note when and where you expect the enemy to take certain actions or make certain decisions.
- Record each event into the description of the COA.
- Where possible, tie each event or activity to time phase lines, timelines, or other specific geographical areas on the situation template. This will help you later when constructing the event template.
- As the enemy force approaches DPs or option points, record each decision and its timelines into the COA description. The description you develop forms the basis for the development of enemy branches and sequels, should they be necessary to support friendly planning.
- Record any decision criteria that are associated with each DP.

5-30. After identifying the set of potential enemy COAs, the initial challenge is to determine which one the enemy will actually adopt. This determination revolves around predicting specific areas and activities which, when observed, will reveal which COAs the enemy has chosen. Nominate the specific areas where you expect key events as NAIs. In a combating terrorism operation NAIs can depict or encompass locations, persons, or actions within the terrorist organization, operation, or other cell. The activities which reveal the intended enemy COA are called indicators.

5-31. Consider each BOS and its role in making the enemy COA successful. Do not limit yourself to a discussion of the enemy force. Address the concept of operation and how it is supported, not just the disposition of forces.

HIGH VALUE TARGETS

5-32. The following techniques will help develop a list of HVTs:

- Prepare and mentally wargame the situation template.
- Note how and where each BOS provides critical support to the enemy COA. This leads to identification of HVTs.

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- Use the list of HVTs in the enemy model as a guide, but do not limit yourself to that list.

- Determine the effect on the enemy COA by destroying or eliminating each HVT and attempt to identify likely enemy responses. The relative worth of each HVT target will vary with the specific situation under consideration and over the course of the enemy COA.

- Identify the times or phases in the enemy COA when the target is most valuable to the enemy commander and make the appropriate notations on the list of HVTs.

- Transfer the refined and updated HVT list to the enemy COA overlay. You will use the list to support staff wargaming and the targeting process. Note on the enemy COA overlay any areas where HVTs must appear or be employed to make the enemy operation successful. Focus on their locations at the times they are most valuable, or just before. These are potential TAI and engagement areas. Cross-reference each potential TAI with the description of the COA that accompanies the template.

- Rely on staff experts for help with enemy BOSs you are unfamiliar with.

- After developing each enemy COA in detail, it may be necessary to reprioritize the order of likely adoption. For example, as a particular enemy COA is developed the analyst discovers that a section of the terrain cannot totally support the adoption of the enemy COA. This may cause a change in the relative priority of the enemy COAs because of terrain constraints.

IDENTIFY INITIAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS

EVENT TEMPLATE

5-33. The event template is a guide for intelligence synchronization and ISR planning. It depicts the NAIs where activity or lack of it will indicate which enemy COA the enemy has adopted. The combination of the NAI, indicators, and time phase lines associated with each enemy COA form the basis of the event template.

5-34. Evaluate each enemy COA to identify its associated NAI. Compare and contrast the NAI and indicators associated with each enemy COA against the others and identify their differences. Concentrate on the differences that will provide the most reliable indications of a unique enemy COA. Mark the selected NAI on the event template. The initial event template focuses only on identifying which of the predicted enemy COAs the enemy has adopted. As needed, update and further refine the event template and its supporting matrix to support friendly decisions identified during staff wargaming.

5-35. Pay particular attention to times and places where the enemy's HVTs are employed or enter areas where they can be easily acquired and engaged. These areas will evolve into NAIs in support of targeting. Also consider places you expect the enemy to take certain actions or make certain decisions, such as the adoption of a branch plan.

5-36. An NAI can be a specific point, route, or an area. NAIs in the OE could include meetings, for example, between individuals or groups, transportation and shipping methods, funding or

money transfers and banking sites, recruiting and training centers, associations with governments. NAIs can match obvious natural terrain features or arbitrary features, such as time phase lines or engagement areas. The NAI should be large enough to encompass the activity, which serves as the indicator of the enemy COA.

EVENT MATRIX

5-37. The event matrix complements the event template by providing details on the type of activity expected to occur at each NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active, and its relationship to other events on the battlefield. Its primary use is in planning intelligence collection; however, it serves as an aid to situation development as well.

5-38. The following techniques will help develop event matrixes:

- Examine the events associated with each NAI on the event template and restate them in the form of indicators.
- Enter the indicators into the event matrix along with the times they are likely to occur.
- Use the time phase lines or timelines from either the situation template or the description of the COA to establish the expected times in the event matrix. If there is a latest time information is of value (LTIOV), based on the expected flow of events, record it into the event matrix as a guide for the G2/S2.
- Refine the event matrix during staff wargaming and the targeting process.
- During staff wargaming, assist in developing the DST which incorporates NAIs that support decisions by the commander and the tracking of HPTs. Additional NAIs are developed from potential NAIs identified on the enemy COA overlays as well as the results of decisions made during wargaming friendly COAs.
- Consider the differences between COAs are usually reflected in different NAIs, but might also consist of different time phase lines or indicators associated with a particular NAI. Also consider the effects of enemy deception attempts on the reliability of each event as an indicator.

5-39. Enemy COA models drive the wargaming of potential friendly COAs. They aid in the construction of the command's DST and other synchronization tools the staff uses during mission execution. Disseminate the enemy COA models as widely as possible. They are the most useful products in allowing other commands and staff sections to develop their own more detailed or specialized enemy COA models.

5-40. The complete event template forms the basis for planning intelligence synchronization strategies, synchronizing intelligence with friendly operations, and preparing the ISP.

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Chapter 6

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-1. Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and to achieve decisive victory. Offensive operations may be conducted to deprive the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position.

6-2. Offensive operations are either force or terrain oriented. Force-oriented operations focus on the enemy. Terrain-oriented operations focus on seizing and retaining control of the terrain and facilities.

6-3. In an urban environment, US and other friendly forces will often conduct offensive operations simultaneously with other operations within adjacent areas. Sometimes this has been referred to as the three-block war.

IPB CONSIDERATIONS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-4. The staff will use many METT-TC factors in their IPB considerations for offensive operations. Consider the following:

- IPB will focus on such things as—
  - Identifying locations, composition, disposition, strengths, and weaknesses of the defending enemy force and their likely intentions, especially where and in what strength the enemy will defend.
  - Determining locations of enemy assembly areas, engagement areas, BPs, indirect-fire weapons systems gaps and flanks, EW units, and air and air defense assets.
  - Determining locations of areas for friendly and enemy air assaults.
  - Examining the database to identify how the enemy conducts defensive operations. Determining if previous defensive operations are consistent with known enemy doctrine and established threat models.
  - Determining locations of enemy C2 and ISR systems and the frequencies used by the information systems linking these systems.
- Concerning terrain, the staff tries to determine such things as the principle AAs to the friendly objective; the most advantageous area for the enemy's main defense to occupy; routes that the enemy will use to conduct counterattacks or withdraw, and other OAKOC factors. Commanders will need information on weather conditions that affect mobility, concealment, and air operations for both friendly and enemy forces.

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- Regarding civil considerations, the staff must consider the effects of refugees on operations and movements; for example, numbers, routes, and direction of movement of displaced civilians and the care and support of civilians within the AO. Another civil consideration is the likely enemy locations with respect to the civilian populace, especially in an urban environment.

- When determining enemy COAs, wargame as many of the enemy COAs that time permits; determine timetable schedules for the enemy's most likely COA and other probable COAs.

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-5. The four types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.

- *Movement to Contact* is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact. The commander conducts movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. A friendly force can be vulnerable during movement to contact; therefore, the intelligence staff must not underestimate the enemy. Detailed IPB products, such as a MCOO with intervisibility lines or an event template, need to be developed. A detailed IPB will enhance the friendly forces' security by indicating danger areas where the force is most likely to make contact with the enemy. IPB helps to determine movement times between phase line and other locations as well as to locate likely enemy defensive locations, engagement areas, observation posts, and obstacles.

- *Attack* is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats the enemy forces or seizes or secures terrain. An attack differs from a movement to contact because enemy main body dispositions are at least partially known, which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization. Prior to an attack, the staff will conduct IPB in order to understand the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. To do that, the staff will need to focus IPB on obtaining information on—

  – Location of enemy's security area or main line of resistance.

  – Location and depth of enemy reserves.

  – Location and extent of contaminated areas.

  – Location and extent of obstacles, possible breach sites, and enemy DPs and engagement areas.

  – Location where the friendly attacking force would encounter rough or restrictive terrain.

  – Enemy use of deception and enemy susceptibility to friendly IO.

  – Enemy ability to conduct limited visibility operations and enemy night vision capabilities and training.

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- *Exploitation* is a type of offensive operation that rapidly follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Coordination with the intelligence officer is critical as an attack operation develops into exploitation. The intelligence staff needs to—

  – Develop information that has updated templates on known enemy locations within the friendly AO.

  – Develop the location of enemy reconnaissance assets, location of enemy defenses, location of enemy reserve forces and their ability to conduct a counterattack. Focus IPB on obtaining information on—

    - Second and third echelon COGs.
    - Location of lodgment areas.
    - Second and third echelon posture (defense in depth; preparation for counter-attack; consolidate and reorganize after previous retirement).

- *Pursuit* is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. Pursuit operations begin when an enemy force attempts to conduct retrograde operations. A pursuit aggressively executed leaves the enemy trapped, unprepared, and unable to defend, and faced with the options of surrendering or complete destruction. The staff needs to determine the enemy's ability to conduct retrograde operations and determine possible routes that the enemy might use to conduct retrograde operations. Other issues that may need to be developed prior to conduct a pursuit are—

  – The enemy's ability to conduct an organized defense.

  – The enemy's use of deception in order to draw friendly forces into enemy engagement areas. The enemy's planning and employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

  – The enemy's ability to reorganize, reinforce, and conduct a counteroffensive.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-6. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows friendly forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting defensive operations include retaining decisive terrain or denying areas to the enemy, attrition of or the fixing of the enemy prior to offensive operations.

6-7. During the planning process, the commander and staff use IPB to identify probable enemy objectives and various approaches and to determine the enemy's vulnerability to counterattack, interdiction, EW, air attacks, and canalization by obstacles. In addition, the staff must use IPB to examine the enemy's capability to conduct airborne and air assault operations and to conduct CBRNE operations. The staff needs to—

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- Focus on the weather, terrain, and the other significant characteristics of the operation environment.

- Ensure that the limits of the AOI have been defined accurately.

- Base the limits of the AOI on the ability of the enemy to project power or move forces into the AO.

- Provide the commander with information on the locations and activities of enemy reconnaissance forces, locations and the activities of enemy FS assets, enemy engineer assets (mobility, countermobility, survivability), as well as locations and the activities of enemy follow-on forces.

6-8. Consider the following techniques for conducting IPB for defensive operations:

- How will the enemy factor in weather and terrain in his ability to overcome and defeat friendly defensive positions. Weather is a significant variable in determining how the defensive battle is planned and fought. The staff looks at weather to assess how it will assist or hinder both friendly and enemy operations, and its affects on enemy employment of weapons of mass destruction.

- Evaluate the terrain from both friendly and enemy perspectives to enable the staff to identify all possible AAs, mobility corridors, and infiltration routes (even down to small trails, routes, or pathways used by animals and people. Determine terrain that allows the commander to mass effects and forces the enemy to piecemeal his forces into friendly engagement areas.

- Identify choke points and intervisibility lines as well as key and decisive terrain that could assist in delaying, disrupting, or destroying enemy forces.

- Consider how the terrain will degrade the friendly force's ability to conduct defensive operations. For example, terrain with a limited road network that canalizes the defending forces allows the enemy to predict its movement and take steps to interdict that movement. Also consider how the enemy could use the terrain to mitigate friendly weapon systems stand-off capabilities.

- Look at how the terrain will influence the enemy's ability to conduct IO against friendly forces.

6-9. The staff should develop threat models which accurately portray how enemy forces conduct offensive operations. The accurate portrayal of how the enemy executes will indicate when and where the enemy is vulnerable to a friendly counterattack. Also evaluate the enemy's ability to attack using a variety of methods simultaneously; for example, use of insurgent forces in friendly rear areas while conducting offensive operations against friendly defensive positions or the simultaneous conducting of cyber-attacks operations against friendly computer networks and communications nodes.

6-10. It is important for the staff to understand the enemy commander's mission and intent as well as how the enemy views the friendly force. The enemy will likely have access to advanced

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technology and will use it to exploit the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the friendly defenses. Also, the enemy will seek or develop methods to overcome or defeat friendly advantages in technology.

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-11. The three types of defensive operations are the mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. All apply at both the tactical and operational levels of war. This is not an all-inclusive list of IPB considerations for all types of offensive and defensive operations.

- *Mobile Defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through decisive attack by a striking force. It focuses on destroying the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack and envelopment. In preparing for a mobile defense the staff needs to provide the commander with detailed information on enemy locations and their AAs; the location of enemy ISR elements and their capabilities to collect on friendly forces. Determine enemy capabilities to conduct IO as well their vulnerability to friendly IO.

- *Area Defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. In an area defense operation the staff must use IPB to determine the locations, strengths, and probable intentions of the attacking enemy force before and through the defensive operation. A high priority for the staff to determine will be the early identification of the enemy's main effort and enemy ISR assets. As with all operations weather, terrain, and the other significant effects on the environment will be important considerations.

- *Retrograde* is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. The enemy may force these operations or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The staff must focus on determining enemy ISR locations and activities (for example, determining that friendly retrograde operations are being implemented). The staff should focus on determining locations and activities of enemy airborne, air assault, and attack aviation units that may try to interdict the movement of friendly forces.

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Chapter 7

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

7-1. The steps of the IPB process remain continuous regardless of the mission, unit, staff section, or echelon.

7-2. The art of applying IPB to stability operations and support operations is in the proper application of the steps to specific situations. The primary difference between IPB for offensive and defensive operations as compared to stability operations and support operations is focus—the degree of detail required and the demand for extensive cultural, religious, ethnographic, political, social, economic, legal, criminal, and demographic data needed to support the decisionmaking process.

7-3. As in other environments, the IPB process must be an effort driven by the commander involving his entire staff. When applied in stability operations or support operations, IPB integrates threat doctrine and operational patterns with weather, terrain, cultural, religious, ethnographic, political, social, economic, legal, criminal, and demographic information. IPB relates these factors to the specific mission and situation. In stability operations and support operations, terrain is viewed from two perspectives: the conventional geographical structure and the perspective that various political factors, economic conditions, and ethnic compositions and factions of the population can become key terrain by their ability to affect the commander's mission.

7-4. Stability operations or support operations can occur unilaterally or with other military operations. It is possible for US forces to be involved in a stability operation or support operation in one portion of the AO and simultaneously conducting offensive and/or defensive operations in another portion of the AO. In an urban environment, US forces could literally be conducting high-intensity operations, within one city block, while on a nearby block conducting counterinsurgency operations, and on a third block providing humanitarian assistance to the local populace. Therefore, the staff must plan and have IPB completed and prepared for rapid transition within full spectrum operations or in an urban environment where it is to be conducting different operations within proximity to each other.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD CONSIDERATIONS

7-5. Using the four steps of IPB, this chapter addresses each step as it relates to stability operations and support operations:

DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

7-6. Consider the following to define the operational environment.

- Expand the AOI.
- Assemble data on the terrain and infrastructure.

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- Compile data on the host nation.

Expand the AOI

7-7. To expand the AOI, the staff must—

- Identify potential sources of assistance to friendly force operations from outside the country or AO.
- Identify military, paramilitary, governmental, nongovernmental, and private volunteer groups that may interact with the friendly force.
- Identify and locate external influences on the operation.
- Consider media, political, and third nation support or interference.
- Identify the geographic boundaries of the operation, applicable legal mandates or terms of reference, and other limitations or constraints that may impact on operations.

Assemble Data on the Terrain and Infrastructure

7-8. To assemble the terrain and infrastructure data, the staff must—

- Identify existing infrastructure that have the potential for use by either enemy or friendly forces in the operational area.
- Include sources of basic sustenance and energy, as well as transportation and communications networks.
- Identify facilities in adjacent or intermediate countries that could support the introduction of friendly forces or the delivery of necessary materials.
- Compile data on geography and climate of the area, to include unusual or violent weather patterns or natural disturbances.

Compile Data on the Host Nation

7-9. To compile data on the host nation, the staff must—

- Identify the existing government and military infrastructure.
- Pay particular attention to their capabilities and limitations with regard to support for or interference in the operations.
- Begin compiling demographic data on the population, to include age, education, religious beliefs, cultural distinctions, ethnic makeup, allocation of wealth, political affiliations and grievances, language, values, and practices.

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DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS

7-10. Describe the environmental effects by considering—

- Legal aspects.
- Weather effects.
- Terrain analysis.

Legal Aspects

7-11. The staff judge advocate (SJA) should fully explain the impact of legal mandates, terms of reference, or other diplomatic agreements. The staff should include legal mandates in place that will have a major effect on friendly COAs, particularly ROE and use of force.

Weather Effects

7-12. To conduct a standard weather analysis for the AO, the staff must consider the effects of weather on—

- Displaced persons or refugees.
- Hostile groups.
- Trafficability.
- Air operations.
- Seaborne operations.
- Night operations.
- Communications.
- Enemy tactics and civil disturbances (rallies, demonstrations).

7-13. In missions involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the staff should—

- Evaluate the environmental impact on the population and friendly operations by determining, for example, if continued rains and flooding could trigger mudslides isolating portions of the population and inhibiting relief operations.
- Prepare climatic studies and frequencies of destructive weather, in order to determine impact on infrastructure, and likelihood of increase in types of disease and environmental hazards.

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Terrain Analysis

7-14. In stability operations and support operations, commanders must view terrain from a stability or support as well as an offensive and defensive perspective. Commanders must consider the various political, economic, and ethnic compositions and factions of the population that comprise the key terrain. Commanders with poor situation understanding of the battlefield effects cannot exploit the opportunities the environment provides, and the threat may find and exploit opportunities in a manner the command did not anticipate.

EVALUATE THE THREAT

7-15. The threat should be evaluated according to the specific mission. Evaluate the threat according to—

- Competing factions.
- Environment.

Competing Factions

7-16. In missions involving competing factions, some critical information and intelligence may exist in coalition, host nation, or US databases, which could be used to begin building a threat model for the operation. Intelligence personnel should recognize differences in threats, strategy, procedures and tactics, as well as weapons, equipment, material, and personnel.

Environment

7-17. When evaluating the threat, the staff should—

- Determine if the environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile to US forces entering with or without host nation approval.
- Determine if the population supports US forces and if that support is contingent on some type or form of material compensation from US forces (for example, food, water, shelter, weapons).
- Determine if the population is organized to oppose US forces and if the people are armed and at what level.
- Identify dissident groups among the population that may publicly support but clandestinely oppose US forces.
- Identify which terrorist groups are present, thought to be present, or have access to the AO, and if they are supported or directed.

DETERMINE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

7-18. To determine enemy COAs, the staff must—

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- Analyze reactions of local populace, multinational partners, NGOs, civilian volunteer groups, and other key third or neutral parties to friendly COAs.

- Wargame terrorist and sabotage actions and other activities where the enemy could reasonably avoid claiming responsibility, which could jeopardize friendly operations or security.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

7-19. There are eight types of stability operations. Each type is discussed below as it relates to IPB.

- Peace Operations.
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
- Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).
- Support to Insurgencies.
- Support to Counterdrug Operations.
- Combating Terrorism.
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).
- Show of Force.

PEACE OPERATIONS

7-20. Peace operations encompass two types of activities: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. *Peacekeeping operations* are military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. These operations are to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing agreement (cease fire, truce) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement. *Peace enforcement operations* are the application of military force, or threat of its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. The intelligence needs of the commander involved in peace operations are unique due to the complex efforts in collecting information in this environment. Information is collected on all parties involved in the conflict. The four steps of the IPB process remain unchanged during peace operations. The following are some of the types of activity to consider.

Define the Operational Environment

7-21. Consider the following to define the operational environment in peace operations:

- Identify and locate all outside influences; for example, political groups, media, and any third-nation support.

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- Identify significant demographic and economic issues. These might include such things as living conditions, religious beliefs, cultural distinctions, allocation of wealth, political grievances.

- Identify the legal mandates, geographic boundaries, ROE, and other limitations that may affect parties involved.

- Identify the organization and structure of all players in the AO and AOI.

- Review the history of the AO and AOI pertinent to the current situation.

- Be aware of the media and its influence on the population of both AO and AOI.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-22. In peace operations the environmental effects to consider are—

- Demographics; for example, root cause of conflict, desire for conflict resolution.

- Weather and terrain. Analyze the effects of weather on visibility among all parties; its affect on activities such as demonstrations and on mobility and operations. Identify terrain that allows all threat groups access to the peacekeeper; its affect on mobility and the separation of the various factions. Analyze the terrain to identify likely current disposition of the threat groups.

- Legal; for example, legal COAs available to all involved parties; likelihood of belligerents to obey laws and treaty provisions; legal limits on use of force.

- Food distribution warehouses or food sources.

- Boat docks to unload relief supplies.

- Civilian relief agencies.

- Nomadic campsites.

- Sources of water.

- Sites of religious, political, or cultural significance.

- Communication structure and capabilities of the parties within the AO.

Evaluate the Threat

7-23. Use the following considerations to evaluate the threat:

- Identify all threat groups. Determine which factions or groups are likely to violate the peace.

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- Determine any relationships among the groups or factions.
- Identify political organizations and their objectives.
- Identify political and religious beliefs that directly affect or influence the conduct of the belligerents.
- Identify threat military capabilities and key personnel.
- Identify local support to all threat parties.
- Identify threat tactics for offense and defense.

Determine Enemy Course of Action

7-24. Use the following IPB considerations to determine enemy COAs:

- Template threat actions, to include combat operations, support functions, terrorist acts, and any other actions that would violate the peace.
- Template threat responses to violations of the peace.
- Template threat, host nation government, and local populace response to friendly force peace enforcement operations.
- Template or analyze faction activity as it relates to past events to analyze potential trends.
- Wargame terrorist actions and other activities where belligerents could reasonably avoid being held accountable.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

7-25. FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID is a primary program that supports friendly nations in or threatened with potential hostilities. FID promotes stability by helping a host nation establish and preserve institutions and facilities responsive to its people's needs. Army forces participating in FID normally advise and assist host nation forces conducting operations. FID is also a specified and significant mission for selected Army Special Operations Forces. (See FM 3-05.102 and FM 3-05.201 for more information on FID.)

7-26. A well-developed IPB and analysis will help identify facts and assumptions about the operation environment, relevant terrain, and the insurgent or terrorist threat itself. A thorough IPB will enable staff planning for effective FID operations. A well-developed IPB also will ensure sound military decisionmaking and contribute to complete staff integration, intelligence synchronization, and target development.

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Define the Operational Environment

7-27. Consider the following to define the operational environment in FID operations.

- Known insurgent activity.
- The nature and strategy of the insurgency. Are there internal factors, external factors, or both that form a basis for the insurgency? Is there an identifiable pattern of insurgent activity?
- Insurgent activity in nations that sponsor these groups.
- International and national support to the insurgents. Sources of moral, logistical, and financial support; US presence or potential presence by itself could be a catalyst for insurgent activity.
- Information on the most recent worldwide insurgent or anti-US activity or intent to conduct such activity.
- Identify all demographic, social, economic, religious, and ethnic issues that could create the perception of unfulfilled needs leading to the insurgency.
- Political environment, the overall form and appeal of the government as the legitimate expression of the peoples' aspirations and the country's traditions and ethos.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-28. In order to identify all weather, terrain, and other significant characteristics of the environment, consider the following factors: living conditions, religious beliefs, cultural divisions, ethnic divisions, allocation of wealth, political parties, language divisions, and tribe, clan, and sub-clan loyalties. In addition—

- Conduct standard OAKOC terrain analysis to include identity of probable locations for ambushes of vehicles or personnel. Within urban areas, look at major thoroughfares and choke points. Determine points of entry, infiltration and exfiltration routes, and agricultural areas.
- Review ROE issues in the AO and AOI. Template ROE areas and indicate areas where ROE change. Identify ways the insurgents or terrorists can use ROE to their advantage.
- Evaluate weather effects on mobility of insurgents and their logistical efforts.
- Evaluate the terrain. Does the terrain or location lend itself to a full range of counterinsurgent operations? Identify all AAs to friendly forces, compounds, installations, or operations.
- Consider migration and settlement patterns to identify which areas are pro-government or pro-insurgent. Identify the locations of groups that create territorial boundaries the insurgents may try to make autonomous so as to gain political advantage.

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- Examine efforts to create or increase unrest and dissension among the population.

- Evaluate how economics and money affect the insurgents' ability to conduct operations.

Evaluate the Threat

7-29. A developing insurgency generally moves through three phases with identifiable activities marking each phase. Knowing the phases and associated activity will help the G2/S2 recognize threat activities and focus his evaluation.

- *Phase 1 - Latent or Incipient Insurgency.* Threat activities range from being only a potential problem to frequently occurring activities displaying an organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity exists. During this phase, the insurgent is primarily concerned with organizing infrastructure, conducting PSYOP, and conducting limited terrorist attacks.

- *Phase 2* - Guerilla *Warfare.* Guerilla warfare begins when the insurgent has gained sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerilla warfare against the government or military units.

- *Phase 3 - Mobile Warfare or War of Movement*. This phase approximates conventional conflict between the organized forces of the insurgent and the established government. The insurgents may continue guerilla or terrorist operations as well.

7-30. With these phases in mind, the intelligence staff identifies all groups in the host nation involved in the current volatile political situation. The IPB focus is on groups that have the potential for hostile action or whose nonviolent activities, such as demonstrations or marches, could stimulate the insurgency. The staff identifies any NGOs that might hinder or help the insurgency, such as media personnel, relief organizations, and students. Use the following IPB considerations to evaluate the threat:

- Determine the type of insurgent groups likely to be encountered. Group the skills and specialties of each group. For example, sniping, demolition, propaganda.

- Identify which insurgent groups are present, thought to be present, or have access to the AO or AOI to include groups that may be initially neutral but could become hostile as operations progress. Is the insurgency linked to a racial, religious, ethnic, or regional base? Does it have a high degree of command and control? What is the level of planning and training with the organization?

- Template all insurgent sanctuaries.

- Identify leaders, trainers, supporters, opportunists, and idealists.

- Describe the preferred tactics of each organization or group. For example, assassination, bombing, arson kidnapping.

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Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-31. Use the following IPB considerations to determine enemy COAs:

- Identify HVTs within the AO by matching friendly vulnerabilities against insurgent capabilities and objectives.
- Use trend and pattern analysis to template, predict, and prioritize insurgent activity to include—
  - The best AAs (infiltration or exfiltration routes) by insurgent groups into the AO.
  - Attacks or raids on friendly installations, compounds, checkpoints, or host nation government facilities.
  - Kidnappings and assassinations of host nation public officials.
  - PSYOP directed against friendly forces or the local population.
  - Ambushes of host nation or US convoys; kidnapping of drivers and insurgent demands.
  - Insurgent surveillance positions and activities on or near host nation or US compounds, installations, friendly rest and relaxation sites, assembly areas, patrol route, airfields, LZs, pickup zones, and AAs.
  - Insurgent training, logistics, finance, or command, control, and communications (C3) and intelligence operations.
  - Centers of pro-insurgent populations. Include an evaluation of individual villages and large political divisions such as states and provinces.
  - Identify areas of anti-government influence and residences of insurgent leadership or key sympathizers.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

7-32. HCA programs consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. In contrast to humanitarian and disaster relief conducted under foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, HCA are planned activities. (See FM 3-05.102 and FM 3-05.201 for more information on HCA.) HCA are limited to the following categories:

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction or repair of public facilities.

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7-33. The following are IPB considerations for HCA programs:

- Identify and locate all internal and external influences on the operation.
- Consider third-nation support or nonsupport of the host government's initiative.
- Identify the locations of groups that might be a threat to mission. Identify government and public sector infrastructure to include available government services, available transportation, LOCs, public service utilities, and other possible factors to support the training mission.
- Assess the media and political acceptance of US involvement within the region.
- Identify the best and worst case timelines and depth of the size and complexity of the mission.
- Focus on demographics and cultural aspects, as well as the physical aspects of the environment and infrastructure development and how each impacts on mission accomplishment. Identify social organizations, government structure, military organizations, and personnel within the host nation assisting the operation.
- Determine if or how the political environment, ethnic diversity, and religious issues will impact on friendly assistance programs.

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES

7-34. The United States supports selected insurgencies that oppose oppressive regimes that work against US interests. The United States coordinates this support with its friends and allies. Because support for insurgency is often covert, many of the operations connected with it are special activities. Special operations forces are well suited to provide support. General purpose forces may also be called on when the situation requires their functional specialties. When US armed forces are directed to do so, they will provide equipment, training, and services to the insurgent force.

7-35. The IPB effort for support to insurgency requires extensive in-depth study and considerable background knowledge of the country and regional situation. The intelligence staff cannot ignore the strategic political situation and focus completely on the tactical situation. It is import and for the staff to have an in-depth knowledge of the country including but not limited to language, customs, culture, religion, and politics.

Define the Operational Environment

7-36. The IPB for support to insurgency begins with a broad evaluation of the AO. During this phase, data is collected to satisfy basic intelligence requirements in the following areas: political, military, economic, religious, social, endemic diseases, and health status of the population, geographic, psychological, cultural, friendly forces, threat forces, and neutral or third-party forces. In addition, consider the following:

- Neighboring countries, boundaries and frontiers, coastal waterways.

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- Third-country support (non-US) for the host nation.

- Host nation population, government, military, and demographics.

- Political structure, economics, and foreign policy and relations.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-37. Climatologic analysis and planning must be done with consideration of long-term effects. The area's climate, weather, and light conditions are analyzed to determine their effects on friendly, threat, and neutral or third-party operations. Planners consider climate types by area and season and their effects on military, political, social, and economic activities. Historic weather data and weather effects overlays are developed during this step. The effects of weather and climate are integrated with terrain analysis.

- Terrain dictates points of entry, infiltration and exfiltration routes, C2 structures for operations, and agricultural areas.

- Weather effects can affect the mobility of the host nation and their logistical efforts; for example, availability in food supply due to weather extremes.

- Migration and settlement patterns will be helpful in indicating which areas are pro-government.

- Political and religious affiliation and practices may influence the people's attitudes towards both enemy and friendly operations.

- Economics may affect the insurgent's ability to conduct offensive operations. It may also influence the populace's support for or against the insurgency.

Evaluate the Threat

7-38. In conducting the threat evaluation, pay attention to the government's military and paramilitary police forces and the infrastructure (reserve, conscript). The planners—

- Determine how the insurgent and government forces can use geography, offensive actions, security, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop a local advantage using one or more of the elements of power.

- Identify leaders, trainers, recruiters, staff members, and logistics personnel.

- Develop doctrinal templates based on observed operating procedures.

- Look at the number of functional specialties within the insurgency. As an example, the number of trainers for a specific weapon might indicate the type of tactics or readiness and the number of personnel trained.

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- Consider the types of weapons that the insurgent has at his disposal. Sophisticated weaponry might be an indicator of external support as well as the insurgent's capability to attack important and possibly well-defended targets.

- Consider the insurgent organization. Does it have a high degree of command and control? What is the level of planning and training within the organization?

- Analyze movement patterns. Movement may coincide with logistical or operational activities.

Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-39. Enemy COAs on the objective might include the following:

- Attacks and raids on military installations or other host nation facilities.

- Attacks on public utilities installations or other forms of economic sabotage.

- Kidnapping and assassination of public officials.

- PSYOP directed against the population.

- Ambushes of host nation or friendly convoys.

- Evasion from friendly troops.

7-40. In determining enemy COAs in support to insurgencies—

- Evaluate and template the best locations for potential insurgent attacks, sabotage, raids, and roadblocks, in order to determine the most likely insurgent COA. Use the key facilities and target graphics as a basis for the evaluation and templating.

- Template insurgent activity near the objective to include—
  - Movement around objectives, such as infiltration or exfiltration routes.
  - Assembly points, rally points, and staging areas.
  - Surveillance positions.

- Template insurgent activity away from their objective areas, to include—
  - Location of known and suspected base camps.
  - Location of known and suspected training camps.
  - Centers of pro-insurgent populations. Include an evaluation of individual villages and large political divisions such as states and provinces.

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- Identify areas of anti-government influence and residences of insurgent leadership or key sympathizers.

- Template insurgent support functions, to include—

  - Logistics routes and transshipment hubs.

  - Cache sites, water sources, agricultural areas, and fuel storage and production areas.

  - Locations of communications equipment. Include commercial establishments and government installations where such equipment may be purchased or stolen.

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

7-41. The military participates in counterdrug operations under the provisions of the National Drug Control Strategy. Military forces may be employed in a variety of operations to support other agencies responsible for detecting, disrupting, interdicting, and destroying illegal drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, material, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities. Military counterdrug efforts support and complement rather than replace counterdrug efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in cooperation with foreign governments.

Define the Operational Environment

7-42. In defining the operational environment in support to counterdrug operations, the staff should—

- Consider local economic conditions; effectiveness of host nation military and LEAs; the nature of the host nation government.

- Identify all characteristics that can influence friendly and drug trafficking organization operations.

- Identify all groups or organizations that influence or are influenced by events in the AO.

- The AOI may extend out into the bordering countries, states, or regions where the unit may not have the ability to ensure adequate force protection and jurisdiction to conduct the operation. The AOI can be further defined by the answers to the following questions:

  - What drugs are the operation directed against?

  - What precursor elements are required for production and where do they originate?

  - How (land, sea, air) do drugs and related materials enter the host nation and the AO?

  - Where do the drugs and related material enter the host nation and AO?

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Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-43. In describing the environmental effects on operations in support of counterdrug operations, consider the following:

- Identify third-nation support or nonsupport of the host government's initiative.
- Identify agricultural areas conducive for drug crops. Determine the periods that comprise the growing season. Consider the hydrography necessary to support the drug crop.
- Determine how terrain will influence the drug trafficking organization's methods of operation. In counterdrug operations, terrain factors affect differently each mode of travel (foot, horse, vehicle, maritime, air movement). Consider weather and terrain in relation to production, growth, and movement cycles of drug crops.
- Identify the international boundaries, borders, or disputed areas, preserves, and reservations that may be involved in drug activities.
- Identify exfiltration routes, including transshipment points and techniques for air, ground, and water movement.
- Identify likely storage areas (cache and warehouses) for drug shipments awaiting transit.

Evaluate the Threat

7-44. In evaluating the threat in support of counterdrug operations, consider the following:

- The structure of the drug organization; for example, family relationships and key personnel (leadership, logisticians, security specialists, chemists).
- Drug organization security elements and their method of operation, in particular how the drugs are protected and concealed prior to, during, and after shipment.
- Narco-terrorist groups and their TTP.
- Support that the local government cannot or will not give to the local populace.
- Threat use of force, such as blackmail, kidnapping, and threats of violence to gain support and to control the populace and the government.
- Threat availability and access to technology.
- Threat ability to detect friendly forces and their operations.
- Threat availability to encrypted communications systems and radar systems.
- What types of weapons and target acquisition systems does the threat use or has access to?

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Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-45. In determining enemy COAs in support of counterdrug operations, the staff should—

- Describe or template—
  - All possible production activities. Consider logistics, security, and training.
  - The activities of drug producers in the AO and AOI.
  - The specific actions of the traffickers through the AO and AOI.
  - Trafficker and producer actions upon confrontation, including legal evasion.
  - The support activities associated with trafficking in the AO and AOI.
  - The security procedures (weapons, booby traps) and other techniques to avoid detection.
- Consider storage areas, drying areas, surface routes, air routes, and water routes.
- Include an evaluation of zones of entry, such as airstrips and ports and types of vehicles or animals used by the traffickers.
- Consider finances, front organizations, civic actions, and money laundering.

COMBATING TERRORISM

7-46. Terrorism is defined as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to instill fear that is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Combating terrorism has two major subcomponents: antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

7-47. The application in combating terrorism must be especially fluid, flexible, and creative. Well-developed IPB and analysis will help identify facts and assumptions about the terrorist threat.

Define the Operational Environment

7-48. In defining the operational environment in support of combating terrorism, the staff should identify the following:

- Known terrorist activity.
- Terrorist activities in nations that sponsor terrorist groups.
- International and national support to the terrorist. Include sources of moral, physical, and financial support.
- If US presence or potential presence by itself could be a catalyst for terrorist activity.

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- Recent anti-US terrorist activity or intent to conduct such activity.
- Demographic issues that make protected areas or personnel attractive.
- Any time constraints that might limit the availability of a target.
- The presence, proliferation, scope, and agenda of potential terrorist groups and known terrorist organizations active in the AO and AOI.
- Any activities and events that will have media coverage.
- Terrorist capability and intent.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-49. Consider what demographic issues make a target attractive to terrorists. How do the demographic factors or issues shape terrorist COAs? For example, the political grievances of a terrorist organization might make some targets more attractive than others. Religious convictions might cause terrorists to disregard assassinations in favor of kidnappings. The following are demographic factors or issues:

- Ethnicity.
- Religion.
- Politics.
- Environment.
- Ideology.
- Distribution of wealth and power.

7-50. In describing the environmental effects on operations in combating terrorism, identify—

- The susceptibility of friendly forces, to terrorists' activity.
- Infiltration routes and transportation nodes used by terrorist organizations.

Evaluate the Threat

7-51. In evaluating the threat in combating terrorism, consider the following:

- Identify which terrorist groups are present, thought to be present, or have access to the AO and AOI.
- Identify the type, structure (cellular), and composition of the terrorist group. Determine if they are state or non-state supported.

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- Conduct threat analysis in order to determine the following:
  - Composition: organization (network or hierarchical), structure, links, associations.
  - Internal discipline.
  - Goals: short term, long term.
  - Dedication: willingness to kill or die for the cause.
  - Religious, political, and ethnic affiliations of the groups.
  - Leaders, trainers, opportunists, and idealists.
  - Group skills and specialties of each organization, such as sniping, demolition, air or water operations, surveillance or reconnaissance, engineering, electronics.
  - Tactics: previous operational experiences and TTP of the groups. Look for any published writings or documents of the terrorist organizations.
- Describe or template demonstrated terrorist activity in the local area over a period of time.

Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-52. In determining enemy COAs in support of combating terrorism, the staff must—

- Identify likely terrorist targets within the protected entity by matching friendly vulnerabilities against terrorist capabilities and objectives.
- Template terrorist actions on potential objectives within the protected entity.
- Template terrorist actions or indicators near the objective, such as location of assembly areas, surveillance of the objective, reconnaissance of possible escape routes.
- Template or describe support functions, such as C2 and ISR activity, training tempo, logistics activity, financial activity.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

7-53. The staff determines the AOI. The AOI includes the routes of ingress and egress in addition to any likely threats to the mission in the NEO location.

Define the Operational Environment

7-54. Within the nation where noncombatants will be evacuated, the staff must—

- Identify the locations of all groups that might influence operations.
- Determine which countries might shelter evacuees.

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- Determine which countries might assist or hinder the operation.

- Identify whether evacuation is expected to be permissive or forced.

- Identify the operational time sensitivity.

- Identify the scope of the demographic situation that has prompted the evacuation. Consider the political, social, economic, legal, and religious situations. Analyze the government, military, and population in general.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-55. In describing the environmental effects on operations in support of NEOs, the staff should—

- Consult with SJA to identify all legal issues that affect the evacuation.

- Identify how local political issues will shape friendly COAs.

- Determine whether or not hostile groups will oppose the evacuation of noncombatants.

- Determine if there are areas where anti-evacuation sentiment is the strongest. Identify areas where the sympathy for the evacuation is the strongest.

- Identify the logistics infrastructure needed to support the evacuation.

- Map the location of key facilities to include foreign embassies, military installations, police stations, and government buildings.

- Conduct a standard OAKOC terrain analysis to—

  – Identify probable locations for ambushes of evacuation vehicles.

  – Identify infiltration routes and assembly areas for enemy attacks on evacuee consolidation points.

  – Identify places suited for anti-US demonstrations and their relative position to evacuation sites and US installations.

- Analyze the effects of weather upon—

  – Adverse groups. Insurgents are more likely to prefer poor weather conditions as opposed to other groups such as demonstrators, who are more likely to prefer better weather conditions.

  – Evacuation operations. Will sudden precipitation or extremes in temperature require changing evacuation facilities?

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Evaluate the Threat

7-56. In evaluating the threat in support of NEOs, the staff should—

- Identify all groups that might intentionally or unintentionally interfere with the evacuation, such as students, labor unions, demonstrators, rioters, host nation forces, and criminal elements. Consider host nation LEAs, military forces, political groups, religious factions, and the general population. Record information concerning likely hostile and adverse groups.

- Using a population status graphic, conduct an analysis for each potentially hostile group. Identify their goals and objectives as well as their position towards the evacuation. Focus on the methods of resistance and techniques employed to achieve these objectives. How would they interfere with the evacuation?

- Identify the areas most likely to harbor people who would interfere with evacuation operations.

- Use an activities matrix to record activities around key routes and consolidation points.

- Use a link diagram or association matrix to identify which key individuals are actively interfering with the evacuation.

- Use the LOC, key facilities, and target graphics to determine where interference might occur.

Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-57. In determining enemy COAs in support of NEOs, the staff should—

- Consider threat influence on the logistics infrastructure. Look for control of workers, such as bus drivers, dockworkers, police, food service personnel, and labor groups.

- Use the key facilities and target graphics to identify the most likely points of interference with the evacuation.

- Template intentional interference with the evacuation by hostile groups at each potential interference point. Consider terrorist actions, ambushes, delays at checkpoints, demonstrations, raids on consolidation points, and sniping. Determine alternate routes or COAs at these points.

- Identify unintentional interference with the evacuation by previously identified or unknown groups and template their activities. Consider riots, criminal activity, arson.

- Template or describe the support functions for groups that would interfere with the evacuation. Consider planning, weapons, ammunition, food, water, shelter, training, or C2.

- Template threat influences on local transportation system.

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SHOW OF FORCE

7-58. A show of force is a mission carried out to demonstrate US resolves in which US forces are deployed to defuse a situation that may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. They can take the form of combined training exercises, rehearsals, forward deployment of military forces, or introduction and buildup of military forces in a region. Consider the following:

- Study in detail the psychology of all key decisionmakers, the host nation information structure and media activities, and the ability to promote the government cause domestically and internationally.
- Identify the scope of pertinent political issues within the region.
- Identify and locate all internal and external influences on the operation.
- Identify the locations of the various groups that might be a threat to the mission.
- Identify available government services, available transportation, LOC, public service utilities, and other support to the operation.
- Assess the political environment, traditions, and people's acceptance of US involvement within the region.
- Analyze the physical aspects of the environment and infrastructure of the region to adopt new operational areas not already dominated by the threat.

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

7-59. The two types of support operations consist of—

- Domestic Support Operations (DSO).
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).

7-60. Military forces conduct DSO in the US and its territories and FHA outside the US and its territories. Military forces have broader requirements and more significant and extensive obligations in DSO than FHA. US forces normally conduct standalone FHA operations only in a permissive environment. In uncertain and hostile environments, US forces conduct FHA operations as part of larger stability, offensive, or defensive operations.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

7-61. DSO are those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies (JP 1-02).

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Define the Operational Environment

7-62. The AO will be defined by higher headquarters. The AOI considerations should include identifying—

- Potential sources of assistance from outside the supported area.
- Further threats to the AO, such as severe weather patterns, aftershocks, or armed urban gangs.
- All military, governmental, and NGOs that may interact with each other.
- Location of all federal property with access right to stage troops and equipment.
- Identifying location of ARNG and USAR centers.
- Location of public and private schools and names of principals.
- Identifying location of state and local government seats of power and jurisdiction.
- Location of operation hospitals and clinics.
- Location of critical utilities (water, electricity, sewer and sanitation, telephone, radio, and television).
- Soldier and civilian area experts; for example, soldiers from the affected area or similar environments and law enforcement gang intelligence units.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-63. In describing the environmental effects on operations in support of DSOs, the staff should—

- Identify terrain critical for food distribution and logistical resource sites that are readily accessible yet able to be secured.
- Analyze terrain suitable for waterway entry, air, rail, and ground for both small transport and military transportation requirements.
- Determine the present and potential extent of the disaster or civil disturbance. Identify the likelihood of additional natural disasters (floods, fires, mudslides, hurricanes) or continued civil disturbances (riots).
- Identify the population sectors which require assistance and determine the type needed.
- Coordinate with LEAs for information on gangs, their affiliations, leadership, and AOs or boundaries. Identify the amount of influence each gang has over the local populace.

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- Focus on demographics, such as population patterns, ethnic divisions, language divisions, and health hazards as well as gang sympathies.

- Consider the effects of the disaster or civil disturbance on the civilian logistics infrastructure; for example, housing availability, hospital capabilities, sources of food and water.

- Identify the limits of your commander's authority. Can he financially obligate the government? Does he have the authority to enforce laws? How does he assist LEAs?

Evaluate the Threat

7-64. The threat in a DSO may only be the weather, terrain and/or time. However, the threat may include gangs, criminal organizations, looters, disease, or pestilence. For threat evaluation, consider the following:

- Determine criminal patterns using threat pattern analysis. Consider the effects that a military presence has on gang members and other criminal elements.

- Evaluate weather and the environment on potential threats. Weather will affect a unit's ability to conduct relief operations. The weather may pose a threat in the form of weather borne diseases, spoiled or contaminated food stuffs, and other environmental hazards.

- Use the traditional OB factors, with modifications to fit the specific situation, to evaluate the threat posed by gangs or similar "organized" groups.

- Identify and evaluate the threat posed by any group that opposes the use of military troops in the operation.

- During civil disturbance operations, identify "opinion makers" and other influential members of the local populace. Identify potential trouble spots and contentious issues. Be aware of legal restrictions on intelligence operations against US citizens.

Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-65. In determining enemy COAs in support of DSO, consider the following:

- Focus on the threat. Is it weather, gangs, or criminal activity? Identify likely targets for looting and vandalism.

- Look at enemy COAs that impact civilian law enforcement capabilities.

- What is the impact on civil-military actions when faced with multiple threats?

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

7-66. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The FHA provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or

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agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. IPB considerations to FHA will likely be similar to the IPB considerations that will be conducted for HCA.

Define the Operational Environment

7-67. In defining the operational environment in support of FHA, the staff should—

- Identify areas or activities that might generate refugee movement.
- Consider threats to the AO such as severe weather, gangs, criminal organizations, religious, ethnic, and racial factions.
- Identify all military, paramilitary, governmental (NGOs, transnational corporations). What is the status of any hostile military or paramilitary forces in the area? Who are the key civilian leaders, community elders, tribal leaders, and their respective supporters?
- Assess host nation infrastructure. What is the condition of LOCs, utilities, transportation systems, and government services? What is the status of sanitation conditions within the AO? Identify storage facilities and requirements.
- Determine the effects of ROE and other force protection measures on threat operations.
- Determine type and location of all land minefields.
- Determine the geography within the AO and its effect on the mission.

Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations

7-68. In describing the environmental effects on operations in support of FHA, the staff should—

- Consider the effects of terrain on locations of land minefields.
- Determine if weather has had an effect on minefield location. Has the thawing and freezing of the ground affected known or suspected minefields?
- Determine the effect weather and terrain will have on refugee movement, military operations, Civil Affairs or PSYOP, mass actions, food supplies, and general mobility.
- Identify the population sectors. Look at urban or rural areas where real or potential threats can blend into the population or gain influence over the population.
- Focus on demographics. Consider, for example, the effects of—
  - Urban and rural population patterns.
  - Ethnic, religious, and racial divisions.
  - Language divisions.
  - Tribe, clan, and sub-clan loyalties.

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- Health hazards.
- Political sympathies.

- Consider the effects of the infrastructure on—
  - Location, activity, and capacity of care distribution points (food, health care).
  - Sources of food and water.
  - Housing availability.
  - Hospital capabilities.
  - Utility services.
  - LEAs and emergency services and their respective capabilities.
- Determine the LOCs that can be used by friendly forces and potential threats to affect movement of humanitarian assistance.
- Locate agricultural areas and other sources of subsistence.
- Determine the present and potential effects of severe weather on the humanitarian operation, refugee movement.
- Determine if the environment is permissive or hostile to the introduction of friendly forces.
- Identify key targets and facilities. Consider that the targets and facilities may also be key terrain.

Evaluate the Threat

7-69. In evaluating the threat in support of FHA, the staff should—

- Consider weather and the environment as potential threats. Weather will impact on your ability to conduct relief operations. For example, if the target of a relief effort is a village isolated by mudslides or another natural disaster, inclement weather may limit or curtail air operations to the site.
- Consider that the environment may pose threats to the health of both mission and host nation personnel in the forms of waterborne diseases, spoiled or contaminated foodstuffs, and other environmental hazards.
- Identify and evaluate the threat posed by any groups that may oppose friendly force operations. Consider groups that may clandestinely oppose the operation even though they publicly pledge support.

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- Consider civilians and local populace (for example, NGO) that may become hostile as the operation progresses.

- Evaluate the threat posed by gangs, paramilitary, terrorist groups or individuals, insurgents, guerilla forces or other organized forces.

- Identify and evaluate potential trouble spots and contentious issues. Look for riot or similar threat indicators.

Determine Enemy Courses of Action

7-70. In determining enemy COAs in support of FHA, the staff should—

- Identify enemy COAs that seek to embarrass friendly forces during the FHA mission. Will the threat use relief workers to embarrass friendly forces?

- Identify the possibility of threat military action against civilians (relief workers and host nation).

- Evaluate the threat imposed by a degradation of the capabilities of host nation law enforcement.

- Evaluate the possibility of unknown or new minefields and other obstacles in the AO.

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Appendix A

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE TARGETING PROCESS

TARGETING METHODOLOGY

A-1. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities (JP 1-02). The methodology used to support the targeting process is **decide**, **detect**, **deliver**, and **assess**. This methodology facilitates the attack of the right target at the right time with the most appropriate asset. The IPB process supports the four functions of the targeting methodology by determining which targets should be attacked and identifying where they can be found. It is a starting point for the targeting process. For additional information concerning the targeting process, see FM 6-20-10.

DECIDE

A-2. IPB assists in developing targeting objectives and guidance by identifying significant threat, military, economic, and political systems that are of importance to friendly forces. The IPB process evaluates a threat's capabilities, vulnerabilities, doctrinal principles, and preferred TTP. It is from the threat doctrine, training practices, and observed patterns and activities that accurate doctrinal templates are constructed. Doctrinal templates then aid in the initial identification of the enemy's COGs and HVTs.

A-3. During the construction of situation templates, HVTs are identified for a specific battlespace and COA. Concurrent with development of the situation template, the threat commander's decision cycle and points associated with each potential COA are examined and key assets become apparent. Those key assets are the HVTs associated with that particular COA or phase of a COA.

A-4. IPB uses three criteria to evaluate potential targets:

- Importance to the threat's abilities to conduct operations.
- Importance to our ability to achieve a mission or objective.
- Importance as a part of a threat BOS capability.

A-5. As a part of COA analysis and comparison, or immediately after, the staff generally starts the targeting process. Using the results of staff wargaming, the target relative value matrix, and IPB as a guide, the staff decides which HVT will become HPTs. HPTs are those targets that must be successfully attacked to accomplish the friendly mission. The HVTs are kept, modified, or replaced by other targets the staff identifies. That process results in a list of prioritized and timed-phased HPTs that are to be acquired and attacked for the friendly mission to succeed. This list of HPTs provides the overall focus and sets the priorities for intelligence synchronization and attack planning.

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A-6. Considerations in determining and prioritizing HPTs are as follows:

- The sequence or order of appearance of the target.
- The ability to detect, identify, classify, locate, and attack the target.
- The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition systems.
- The ability to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target on the basis of attack guidance.
- The decision of what attack system to use is made at the same time as the decision on when to acquire and attack the target. Coordination is required when deciding to attack with two different means; for example, electronic attack (EA) and direct attack. The means of attack selected will be based on the commander's targeting concept which will be captured in the attack guidance matrix (AGM).

A-7. Once the commander has approved a target, the G2/S2 develops target and objective studies to support mission planning. Target and objective studies are focused, detailed intelligence products that aid in the application of fires or the maneuver of forces against a specific target set or area. These studies are graphically oriented and may use many of the graphics derived during the IPB process. One such product is the target folder, which may contain the following information depending on the specific mission:

- Orientation graphic.
- Time-distance graphic.
- Weather forecast.
- Hydrographic forecast and astronomical data.
- Intelligence briefing notes for mission.
- Graphic intelligence summary (INTSUM).

A-8. The G2/S2, fire support element (FSE), and the G3/S3 refine the target list throughout COA analysis, the wargame, and COA comparison. The target list represents targets that will best achieve or contribute to the commander's objectives. All targets placed on a target list resulting from the target development process are HPTs. The target list leads to the targeting conference. The results of the targeting conference set the stage for the three remaining phases of the targeting process—detect, deliver, and assess.

A-9. The target list is made up of target categories. The following is a list of some of the possible target categories. There may be more or less depending on the mission.

- C3.
- FS.
- Maneuver.

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- Air Defense.
- Engineer.
- NBC.
- WMD.
- ISR.
- Radio Electronic Combat.
- Logistics:
  - Bulk fuels (Class III petroleum, oils, and lubricants).
  - Class I (Subsistence); Class II (Clothing, Individual Equipment, Tentage, Unclassified Maps); Class IV (Fortification, Barriers, and Construction Materials).
  - Ammunition storage sites and distribution points (Class V Ammunition).
  - Maintenance and repair units (Class IX Maintenance).
- Lift.
- LOCs.
- Terrorists or Insurgents:
  - Terrorist or insurgent logistics, personnel, locations.
  - Training bases.
  - Mission support centers.
  - Recruitment sites.
  - Safe houses or sites.
  - Finances—personnel, transfer methods, server nodes.

DETECT

A-10. During the detect phase, targets selected in the decide phase are acquired for attack. The G2/S2 has the responsibility for detecting and tracking each target selected for the command target list. The situation template depicts all confirmed threat locations to include those identified as targets in the IPB process. Targets that are “un-located” will be doctrinally templated until their location is confirmed.

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A-11. The G2/S2 and other staff elements assist in creating the event template and DST to depict current and predicted threat locations. The locations where targets are anticipated are designated as NAIs on the DST. Once identified, NAIs can then be used to confirm or deny a threat's activities or adoption of a particular COA. Additionally, threat DPs or decision phase lines, TAIs, and HPTs are identified.

A-12. The intelligence synchronization manager will focus on acquiring previously un-located threat assets and confirm the location of previously acquired targets within the battlefield environment using NAIs. Locations of threat units and targets, developed through intelligence synchronization and analysis, will be displayed on the current intelligence situation map.

A-13. The DST and the intelligence synchronization matrix (ISM) are management tools used to determine how the HPT can be acquired and attacked. They allow wargaming participants to record their assessment of sensor systems and attack systems to acquire and attack HPTs at a critical event or phase of the battle. If the result of the wargame indicates that timeliness is critical, the intelligence synchronization manager plans and coordinates for the direct dissemination of targeting data from the collection asset to the FSCOORD or even the attack asset to shorten the reaction time between acquisition and attack. The data should be passed simultaneously to the G2/S2 for additional analysis to confirm or change previous IPB products.

DELIVER

A-14. The third phase in the target process is the delivery of lethal and non-lethal fires to the target. Based on the G2/S2's knowledge of the target, a determination of the desired effect (divert, limit, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy) and available weapons systems will determine the appropriate attack system identified during the decide phase.

A-15. During the wargame, DPs were developed and linked to events, areas (NAIs and TAIs), or points on the battlefield. These DPs cue the command decisions and staff actions where and when tactical decisions are needed. When a DP is triggered that involves that attack of a designated target, the FSCOORD, using the AGM and the current situation, determines if the desired effect can be achieved by the plan developed in the decide phase. If it can, the FSCOORD selects the appropriate friendly attack system to be employed. He synchronizes and determines the time on target, the desired effect, and the attack system to support the commander's guidance and friendly COA.

ASSESS

A-16. The key element of the assess phase from the perspective of IPB is combat assessment. Combat assessment is the determination of overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment—

- Provides a series of timely and accurate "snapshots" of the effect operations are having on the threat.
- Provides commanders with the information they need to quickly allocate or redirect forces to make the best use of available resources and combat power.
- Includes battle damage assessment (BDA); munitions effect assessment (MEA), and reattack recommendation.

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A-17. The results of collection for combat assessment are also incorporated into the IPB process for continued analysis of the threat.

TARGETING CHALLENGES

A-18. Another challenge in the OE will be to determine what the most serious threat is. Will it come from the front, the flanks, or the rear? Can it come simultaneously? Measuring the effectiveness of preventative targeting—anticipating an asymmetric attack and implementing force protection and other countermeasures—will often involve a look at what did not happen instead of what did happen. Locating the enemy's COG as a potential target will be another challenge within the OE.

A-19. Our ability to separate combatant from noncombatant will continue to be a challenge. The use of deception, obscurants, and other IO methods to hide potential targets will increase. The threat will likely see the value of using civilian vehicles and aircraft as weapons systems or weapons.

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APPENDIX B

SMALL UNIT SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

This appendix was originally prepared as ST 2-91.6.

B-1. The timely collection, reporting, and dissemination of relevant and accurate information update the intelligence database, intelligence (IPB) products, and the commander's situational understanding. New information combined with already existing information allows for continuous IPB that evaluates the situation facing the commander and drives new iterations of MDMP. It is critical to the IPB process and subsequently to filling in blanks to the commander's situational understanding that subordinate units disseminate all collected information in a timely manner.

B-2. This appendix is a compilation of tools to help all small units as well as soldiers collect, report, and disseminate information in support of the IPB process.

B-3. This appendix is not intended to train soldiers as intelligence collectors or to make the soldier an expert on intelligence collection. It is only designed to introduce the basics of questioning and reporting and to provide some tools for patrols and S2s.

Section I - Combat Patrolling

OBTAINING INFORMATION

B-4. The battalion S2 and S3 are responsible for coordinating and directing the battalion's ISR effort.

COLLECT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION

B-5. During the intelligence cycle, the commander identifies his PIRs. This information is critical to the commander since it affects how he will execute operations. The PIR forms the basis of the battalion's ISR plan. The S2 and S3 develop the collection plan. This plan specifies the CCIRs (PIRs and friendly forces information requirements [FFIR]) that need to be answered and assigns responsibility for obtaining that information to support the unit's assigned operations.

B-6. The commander or S3 briefs the patrol leader on the specifics of the mission. During this brief, the patrol leader ensures that he understands the commander's expectations and concept of operation. Failure to do so can result in collection of information that serves no purpose for the commander. The patrol leader also ensures that the patrol understands the specific requirements and the purpose of the mission. The patrol's mission is complete once all information is collected, any required debriefings are complete, and information is transmitted to

the correct headquarters. All information collected should be disseminated to all members of the patrol.

INDICATORS

B-7. Soldiers report the information they obtain which answers the specified and implied information collection tasks involved with the execution of their assigned mission. They also report potential indicators that analysts might be able to use to produce intelligence. See Table B-1 for a list of potential indicators.

Table B-1. Potential Indicators.

<table>
<tr><th>SIGHT</th><th>HEARING</th><th>TOUCH</th><th>SMELL</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">A soldier looks for—
Enemy personnel, vehicles, and aircraft.
Sudden or unusual movement.
New local inhabitants.
Smoke or dust.
Unusual movement of farm or wild animals.
Unusual activity or lack of activity by local inhabitants, especially at times and places that are normally inactive or active.
Vehicle or personnel tracks.
Movement of local inhabitants along uncleared areas, routes, or paths.
Signs or evidence of enemy occupation or threat trends.
Recently cut foliage or vegetation.
Muzzle flashes, lights, fires, or reflections.
Amount and type of trash.</td><td>A soldier listens for—
Running engines or track sounds.
Voices.
Metallic sounds.
Gunfire (by type of weapon).
Unusual calm or silence.
Dismounted movement.
Aircraft.</td><td>A soldier feels for—
Warmth of coals and materials from fires.
Freshness of tracks.
Age of food or trash.</td><td>A soldier smells for—
Vehicle exhaust.
Burning petroleum products.
Cooking food.
Age of food or trash.
Human waste.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Armed Elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.
Homes and Buildings: Condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock.
Infrastructure: Presence of functioning stores, service stations, other.
People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or DPRE status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.
Contrast: Has anything changed? For example, are there new locks on buildings? Are windows boarded up or previously boarded-up windows now open, indicating a change of use of a building? Have buildings been defaced with graffiti?</td></tr>
</table>

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REPORTING INFORMATION

B-8. During breaks or once the patrol is complete, element leaders debrief the soldiers and give the information to designated recorders. Recorders write down information and make or collect sketches as appropriate to the mission. Element leaders then disseminate the information obtained back to the soldiers. This ensures that everyone has the information and, if necessary, can relay the information back to battalion. Refer to FM 7-92, Chapter 4, for more information on patrol TTP.

B-9. Information of immediate interest to the commander should be transmitted to the S2 as soon as the tactical situation allows. Other information is reported upon the patrol's return to base as part of normal reporting and to the S2 during his patrol debriefing. Follow-up reports are submitted after the S2 section performs the debriefing. These reports should include Global Positioning System (GPS) locations, sketches of streets and facilities, and photographs whenever possible. See Section III for detailed reporting requirements.

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Section II - Tactical Questioning

EVERY SOLDIER CAN PROVIDE USEFUL INFORMATION

B-10. Every soldier, as a part of a small unit, can provide useful information and is an essential component to the commander's achieving situational understanding. Every soldier develops a special level of situational awareness simply due to exposure to events occurring in the AO and has the opportunity to collect information by observation and interaction with the population and environment. This task is critical because the environment in which we operate is characterized by violence, uncertainty, complexity, and asymmetric methods by the threat. The increased situational awareness that soldiers develop through personal contact and observation is a critical element of the friendly force's ability to more fully understand the operational environment.

B-11. Small units and individual soldiers contribute to situational awareness and collect information through a number of ways (for example, patrol reporting can cue collection by a human intelligence [HUMINT] team). Tactical questioning is a critical element of small-unit operations. Through tactical questioning, observing and interacting with the local environment during the conduct of missions, handling enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)/detainees, and handling captured enemy documents (CEDs) and captured enemy equipment (CEE), soldiers serve as the commander's "eyes and ears" whether—

- Performing traditional offensive or defensive missions.
- Performing a patrol in a stability operation.
- Manning a checkpoint or a roadblock.
- Occupying an observation post.
- Passing through areas in convoys.
- Doing anything that involves observing and reporting elements of the environment and activities of the population in the AO.

B-12. Tactical questioning is the expedient initial questioning for information of immediate value. When the term applies to the interaction with the local population, it is not really questioning but is more conversational in nature. The task can be designed to build rapport as much as to collect information and understand the environment. The soldier conducts tactical questioning based on the unit's standing operating procedures (SOPs), ROE, and the order for that mission. Small-unit leaders must include specific guidance for tactical questioning in the OPORD for appropriate missions. The Brigade and Battalion S2s and S3s must provide appropriate specific guidance in the form of information collection tasks, down to company, troop, or battery level to help guide tactical questioning. This information that the soldier reports as a result of tactical

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questioning will be passed up the chain of command (some to the Battalion S2 and Brigade S2) and forms a vital part of planning and operations. Careful and quick handling of EPWs/detainees and documents also helps the ISR effort.

INTERACTION WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE

B-13. Information collection can and should occur at all times during operations. Collection of combat information consists of becoming familiar with the surrounding environment, to include the people, infrastructure, and terrain, as well as recognizing **change**. Like a police officer "walking the beat" in a neighborhood day after day, soldiers at all ranks and echelons must be able to recognize that something has changed and, if possible, why. Even if the soldier cannot determine why something changed, simply reporting that there has been a change may help MI personnel. Soldiers should train themselves to become constantly aware of conditions such as—

- Armed Elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.
- Homes and Buildings: Condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock.
- Infrastructure: Presence of functioning stores, service stations, other.
- People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or displaced persons, refugees, or evacuees (DPRE) status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.
- Contrast: Has anything changed? For example, are there new locks on buildings? Are windows boarded up or previously boarded-up windows now open, indicating a change of use of a building? Have buildings been defaced with graffiti?

B-14. If everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the IRs. All soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must know the commander's IRs and their responsibility to observe and report.

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Section III - Reporting

B-15. All information collected by patrols or others in contact with the local population is reported through the chain of command to the unit S2. The S2 is responsible for transmitting the information through intelligence channels to the supported MI elements according to unit intelligence tasks and the OPORD for the current mission. These elements may include a HUMINT collector team (HCT) if attached, the supported Brigade or Division S2, or the operational management team (OMT). Figure B-1 shows the tactical HUMINT organization and how OMTs report. The most common report format for a patrol is the SALUTE report. (See Figures B-2 and B-3.)



Figure B-1. Tactical HUMINT Organization.

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SALUTE

Line One - (S)ize/Who: Expressed as a quantity and echelon or size (for example, 1 x BDE). If multiple units are involved in the activity being reported, there can be multiple entries (for example, 1 x BDE; 2 x BN). Nonstandard units are reported as such (for example, bomb-making class; support staff, 150 chemical rounds).

Line Two - (A)ctivity/What: This line relates to the PIRs being reported on and should be a concise bullet statement.

Line Three - (L)ocation/Where: Generally a grid coordinate, including the 100,000-meter grid zone designator. The entry can also be an address, if appropriate, but still should include an 8-digit grid coordinate. If the activity being reported involves movement (for example, advance, withdrawal), the location entry will include "From" and "To" entries. The route used will be reported under "Equipment/How."

Line Four - (U)nit/Who: This entry identifies who is performing the activity described in the "Activity/What" entry. Include the complete designation of a military unit, identification of a civilian or insurgent group, or the full name of an individual, as appropriate.

Line Five - (T)ime/When: For a future event, this is when the activity will initiate. Ongoing events are reported as such.

Line Six - (E)quipment/How: The information reported in this entry clarifies, completes, and/or expands upon information reported in any of the previous entries. It includes information concerning equipment involved, tactics used, and any essential elements of information not reported in the previous paragraphs.

Figure B-2. SALUTE Report Guidelines.

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TO: Usually the address of the supported S2/G2 (according to unit SOP).
FROM: Your unit or team designation or your duty position, as appropriate.
DTG: The date-time group of when the report is being submitted.
Report Number: From local SOP.

1. (S)ize/Who: Expressed as a quantity and echelon or size (for example, 1 x BDE). If multiple echelons are involved in the activity being reported, there can be multiple entries (for example,1 x BDE; 2 x BN). Nonstandard units are reported as such (for example, bomb-making class; support staff).

2. (A)ctivity/What: This line is the focal point of the report and relates to the PIR or important non-PIR information being reported. It should be a concise bullet statement.

3. (L)ocation/Where: Generally a grid coordinate, including the 100,000-meter grid zone designator. The entry can also be an address, if appropriate, but still should include an 8-digit grid coordinate. City names will always be followed by the two-character country code. If the activity being reported involves movement (advance, withdrawal), the location entry will include "From" and "To" entries. The route used will be reported under "Equipment/How."

4. (U)nit/Who: This entry identifies who is performing the activity described in the "Activity/What" entry. Include the complete designation of a military unit, identification of a civilian or insurgent group, or the full name of an individual, as appropriate.

5. (T)ime/When: For a future event, this is when the activity will initiate. Past events are usually not the subject of SALUTE reports but if a past event is to be reported, the Time/When entry will generally reflect when the event ended. Ongoing events are reported as such. Reports of composition of forces, morale, and Electronic Technical Data and other non-event topics are reported as ongoing. When reporting on a disposition, the "Time/When" entry is generally the last time the source was at the disposition.

6. (E)quipment/How: The information reported in this entry clarifies, completes, and/or expands upon information reported in any of the previous entries. It includes information concerning equipment involved, tactics used, and any follow-up information not reported in the previous paragraphs.

7. Remarks: Use this entry to report the source of the information, whether a person, a CED, open-source media, or other source. Include the date of information and the PIR that the reported information addresses. Include map data for coordinates given in the "Location/ Where" entry, stating map series name, sheet number, scale, and edition. If there are enclosures to the SALUTE report, such as sketches, annotate them here.

NOTE: ***The above examples are for guidance and not to be construed as strict requirements. SALUTE reports of combat activity may only contain a word or two in each entry, whereas Intelligence reports tend to include more detail.***

Figure B-3. Guidance on Preparing a Written SALUTE Report.

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B-16. For tactical questioning, there are four levels of reporting based on mission:

- Level 1 - Information of critical tactical value is reported immediately to the S2 section, while the soldiers are still out on patrol. These reports are sent via channels prescribed in the unit SOP. SALUTE reports are an example of Level I reporting (Figure B-4).

- Level 2 - Immediately upon return to base, the patrol will conduct an after-action report (AAR) and write a patrol report (Figure B-5). The format may be modified to more thoroughly capture area of responsibility (AOR) and mission-specific information. This report is passed to the S2 section prior to a formal debriefing. Patrol leaders must report as completely and accurately as possible since this report will form the basis of the debriefing by the S2 section which will follow.

- Level 3 - After receiving the initial patrol report, the S2 section will debrief the patrol for further details and address PIRs and IRs not already covered in the patrol report. See Figure B-6 for an example Intelligence Debrief Format (Level 3 Report).

- Level 4 - Follow-up reporting is submitted as needed after the unit S2 section performs the debriefing.

B-17. The four levels of reporting facilitate the unit S2 section's recording and disseminating of all the subtle and important details of the activities for all-source analysis, future planning, and passing to higher S2/G2 and command post. Reporting this information to your higher headquarters allows them to analyze a broad range of information and intelligence and to disseminate intelligence back to both your level and higher. This aspect of tactical intelligence is the backbone of the "mud-to-space" intelligence paradigm. Therefore, the unit S2 must proactively and meticulously lead a unit-debriefing program. Additionally, the unit S2 section must ensure that information of HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) value is reported to the J/G2X.

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SALUTE Report

TO: _____ **DTG: _____**

FROM: _____ **REPORT NUMBER:_____**

1. SIZE:

2. ACTIVITY:

3. LOCATION:

4. UNIT:

5. TIME:

6. EQUIPMENT (HOW):

7. REMARKS:

Figure B-4. SALUTE Report (Level 1 Report).

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The Patrol reports are submitted to the S2 section based on information observed by the patrol. All pertinent information is included in the report to ensure completeness. The report is then disseminated in accordance with appropriate SOPs.

(DESIGNATION OF PATROL)
TO: _____
MAPS: _____

A. Size and composition of patrol.
B. Mission.
C. Time of departure.
D. Time of return.
E. Routes out and back.
F. Terrain: (Description of the terrain: dry, swampy, jungle, thickly wooded, high brush, rocky; deepness of ravines and draws; condition of bridges as to type, size, and strength; effect on armor and wheeled vehicles.)
G. Enemy: (Strength, disposition, condition of defense, equipment, weapons, attitude, morale, exact location, movements, and any shift in disposition; time activity was observed; coordinates where activity occurred.)
H. Any map corrections.
I. (Not used.)
J. Miscellaneous information (including aspects of NBC warfare).
K. Results of encounters with enemy: (Enemy prisoners and disposition, identifications, enemy casualties, captured documents, and equipment.)
L. Condition of patrol (including disposition of any dead or wounded).
M. Conditions and recommendations (include to what extent the task was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).

_____ _____ _____
Signature Rank Unit of Patrol Leader

N. Additional remarks by interrogator.

_____ _____ _____ _____
Signature Rank Unit of Interrogator Time

O. Distribution.

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Figure B-5. Patrol Report Format (Level 2 Report).

PATROL DEBRIEF FORMAT

Unit (Sqd/Plt/Co):	Patrol Leader:
Date of Mission:	Debrief Number (S2 use only):
Depart Time:	Return Time:

Mission:
- ❑ Dismounted Patrol in TOWN OF_____GRID:_____
- ❑ Mounted Patrol in TOWNS OF_____ GRIDS:_____
- ❑ Fixed guard/checkpoint at:_____
- ❑ Respond to:_____
- ❑ Other:_____
- ❑ Attitude of General Population Towards US/Coalition Forces (Select one): FAVORABLE/UNFAVORABLE

PATROL ROUTE

Describe key locations visited during patrol (town, ethnic minority neighborhood, school, market, protected church, etc.)

LOCATION	GRID	OBSERVATIONS, TRENDS (e.g. BETTER OR WORSE THAN BEFORE?)	DIGITAL PHOTO #

PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED

List important/interesting persons encountered. Describe what they said or did that was significant in the PATROL NARRATIVE.

NAME (Last/First)	SEX	ETHNICITY	HOMETOWN	TAG# (if detained)	DESCRIPTION (or digital photo #)

VEHICLE ENCOUNTERED

List passengers in PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED (above). Discuss significant vehicles in PATROL NARRATIVE.

PASSENGERS (NAME: Last/First)	COLOR	MAKE	MODEL	LIC NO.	VIN NO.	LOCATION	DIGITAL PHOTO #

CAPTURED EQUIPMENT

Explain circumstances leading to capture of equipment in PATROL NARRATIVE.

QUANTITY	ITEM DESCRIPTION	TAG NUMBER	SERIAL NUMBER	DIGITAL PHOTO #

Figure B-6. Example Intelligence Debrief Format (Level 3 Report).

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CAPTURED EQUIPMENT (Continued)
Explain circumstances leading to capture of equipment in PATROL NARRATIVE.

PIRs/IRs ANSWERED
Provide information pertaining to Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) or Information Requirements (IRs). List PIR or IR number.

PATROL NARRATIVE
Describe the important events of patrol. Include 5 Ws (who, what, when, where, and why). Provide photo number for digital photos.

What to report when you don't know what to report:

- Upcoming events
- Conditions of schools/clinics
- Status of electric power
- Condition of crops/harvest
- Map corrections
- New construction/material
- New military vehicles/ minefields/IEDs
- Billboards/posters/leaflets
- New damage or vandalism
- What's new and on sale in shops
- Black market activity
- Upcoming market days
- Number of houses in town
- Stretches of bad road
- Buses and who is in them
- New antennas or wires
- NGO presence/stickers
- Possible gang/criminal activity
- Local address system (street names and numbers)

ATTACHMENTS
List attachments or enclosures to this debrief. Example: sketch, disk with digital photos, captured documents, political rally poster, confiscated weapon, etc. Ensure that any attached item is described in the narrative above.

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Figure B-6. Example Intelligence Debrief Format (Level 3 Report) (continued).

Section IV - Mission Responsibilities

B-18. Soldiers on patrol, or other missions that put them in contact with locals, are potentially a valuable source of information. A serious effort must be made at each echelon of command to fully exploit this potential. Leaders can enhance this effort by ensuring that collection and reporting tasks are trained and efficiently executed at each echelon. These tasks are discussed below.

Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:

- Train and integrate specific tactical questioning in the planning, preparation, and execution of patrols, traffic control point (TCPs) or roadblocks, and convoys based on unit tasking and guidance.
- Fully prepare for and participate in the unit S2's debriefing program (if necessary, demand the debriefing) after all patrols, TCPs or roadblocks, and convoys.
- Report information based on visual observations and tactical questioning either in preparation for the debriefing or immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.
- Carefully carry out EPW/detainee and document handling during patrols, TCPs or roadblocks, and convoys.
- Conduct captured enemy materiel handling and local SOPs or OPORDs.

Platoon Leader:

- Provide tasking and guidance to squad, section, patrol, TCPs or roadblocks, and convoy leaders on topic areas for tactical questioning based on unit tasking and guidance.
- Fully support the unit S2's debriefing program and make sure it is mandatory that all patrols, TCPs or roadblocks, and convoy soldiers participate in the debriefing.
- Reinforce the importance of the procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

Company/Troop/Battery Commander:

- Provide tasking and guidance to platoon leaders on topic areas for tactical questioning based on unit tasking and guidance.

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- Pass information to and review IPB products (especially those specific to the environment) for the Battalion S2 and/or Brigade S2 sections to improve their knowledge of the environment and the threat.

- Fully support the unit S2's debriefing program and make sure it is mandatory that all patrols, TCPs or roadblocks, and convoy soldiers participate in the debriefing.

- Reinforce the importance of the procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

- Act with caution on information reported by patrols and HCTs. Single-source, unanalyzed information can be misleading, and use of it should be tempered with all-source analyzed intelligence.

Battalion S2 and S3 Sections:

- Provide tasking and guidance to company, troop, or battery commanders on topic areas for tactical questioning based on unit PIRs.

- Provide intelligence and information (to include open-source information) focused on the company, troop, or battery to help soldiers improve their cultural knowledge and situational awareness in order to conduct tactical questioning.

- Establish a program so that all patrols, TCPs or roadblocks, and convoys are debriefed (to doctrinal standards).

- Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

- Coordinate HCTs and other intelligence support as appropriate.

S2 DEBRIEFING GUIDE

B-19. Since every soldier is a potential source of information, the S2 debriefing is one way that information collected by these soldiers gets into the intelligence system. The Battalion S2 section is responsible for debriefing returning patrols, leaders who have traveled to meetings, returning HCTs, helicopter pilots, and others who have obtained information of intelligence value. The S2 section debriefs personnel, writes and submits reports, or reports information verbally, as appropriate. The requirement for a debriefing by the S2 section following each mission should be a part of the mission pre-brief. Leaders should not consider the mission complete and the personnel released until the reporting and debriefings are done.

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MISSION DEBRIEF

B-20. The S2 section debriefing should follow along the lines of the mission briefing—review the route traveled, collection objectives of the patrol, methods employed. By the time the S2 section does its debriefing, it should be in receipt of the patrol report. Having the patrol report will streamline the S2 debriefing process, allowing the S2 section to concentrate on filling in gaps and following up on reported information.

B-21. A practical method for the S2 to use for the debriefing is to review the patrol actions chronologically. It is easier to recall and record information if it is broken into smaller pieces that flow logically. For example:

- Use a map to determine segments of the route traveled by establishing common points of reference (CPRs). Start at the beginning of the patrol route and let the patrol leader show you on the map the route traveled.
- Break a long route into segments using towns, location of events, terrain features, or other convenient landmarks as CPRs.
- Ask the patrol leader: "From here (1st CPR) to here (2d CPR), what did you see (or hear or learn about)?" The goal is to extract information of intelligence value. Avoid asking ***only*** for the PIRs. Doing so will tend to limit the patrol leader's answers, and you might miss something of significance. Instead, let him tell you everything he learned while on that segment of his trip. Use follow-up questions to get complete information, always remembering to ask "What else" or "What other" before leaving a topic.
- If the patrol had digital cameras, it is helpful to use the pictures they have taken during the debriefing.
- Once a segment of travel has been fully exploited, move on to the next segment, questioning from the 2d CPR to the 3d and continuing the process until the entire route has been exploited.

GENERAL TOPICS

B-22. Table B-2 contains generic topics for debriefings. The S2s will generally write their reports as intelligence information reports (IIRs) or other locally mandated formats. Information of immediate tactical value should have been reported by patrols in SALUTE format while they were still out on their mission.

S2 SALUTE REPORTING GUIDANCE

B-23. Report formats require brief entries which require the collector to break information into basic elements: who, what, where, when, why, and how. This allows for efficient reporting via

electronic or hardcopy medium. It also allows the analyst to quickly scan multiple reports to find specific information.

Table B-2. Generic Topics for Debriefings.

MILITARY (FACTION) ACTIVITIES	• Collect Order of Battle information: — Unit identification, unit size, unit dispositions. — Personnel strength. — Activities of personnel present. — Equipment present and condition. — Weapons present and condition, state of preparedness. — Special weapons present, quantities, deployment. — Vehicles present and condition. — POL supply levels and transportation available. — What was the reaction (if any) to the presence of a US or multinational force patrol? • Do any of the above represent a change from the norm?
CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES (LOCAL POPULACE)	• What is the ethnic makeup of the population? • Are disparate ethnic groups congregating together? • Are the usual civilian activities (for example, markets) ongoing? • Are there unusually large gatherings of people present? • Are normal gatherings missing or significantly smaller than usual? • What graffiti is present and what message does it convey? • What was the reaction (if any) to the presence of a US or multinational force patrol? • Do any of the above represent a change from the norm?
INFRASTRUCTURE	• What are the conditions of the roads? • What are the conditions of buildings? • Are utilities (water, electricity, sewer) functioning and adequate? • Are radio stations broadcasting any anti- or pro-US statements? • Are schools, hospitals, post offices open? • What NGOs are operating in the area? What are they doing? • Is there any interference with NGO activity? If so, by whom? • What shortages of food are there? • Do any of the above represent a change from the norm?

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GLOSSARY

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 2-0 is the proponent FM (authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (¶) where they are discussed. For other terms, the number of the proponent FM follows the definition. JP 1-02 and FM 1-02 are posted in the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on CD-ROM.

- Use this URL to access JP 1-02 online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.
- Use this URL to access FM 1-02 online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/101_5_1.pdf.
- Follow this path to access JP 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM: Mainmenu>Joint Electronic Library>DOD Dictionary.
- Follow this path to access FM 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM: Mainmenu>Joint Electronic Library>Service Publications>Multiservice Pubs> FM 101-5-1.

AA	avenues of approach
AAR	after-action report
AAA	air avenues of approach
AC	Active Component
ACE	analysis and control element
ADA	air defense artillery
AGM	attack guidance matrix
AO	area of operation
AOI	area of interest
AOIR	area of intelligence responsibility
AOR	area of responsibility
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASAS	all-source analysis system
BDA	battle damage assessment
BMCT	Begin Morning Civil Twilight
BMNT	Begin Morning Nautical Twilight
BOS	Battlefield Operating System

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BP	battle position
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CD	counterdrug
CED	captured enemy document
CEE	captured enemy equipment
CI	counterintelligence
CMO	civil-military operations
co	company
COA	course of action
COE	contemporary operational environment
COG	center of gravity
CPR	command point of reference
CSS	combat service support
DOD	Department of Defense
DP	decision point
DPRE	displaced persons, refugees, or evacuees
DS	direct support
DSO	domestic support operations
DST	decision support template
DTG	date-time group
DTO	drug trafficking organization
EA	electronic attack
EAC	echelons above corps

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EECT	End Evening Civil Twilight
EENT	End Evening Nautical Twilight
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
EW	electronic warfare
FFIR	friendly forces information requirements
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLIR	forward-looking infrared
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FS	fire support
FSCOORD	Fire Support Coordinator
FSE	fire support element
FSO	fire support officer
G1/S1	Personnel and Manpower Staff Section
G2/S2	Intelligence Staff Section
G3/S3	Operations Staff Section
G4/S4	Logistics and Supply Section
G5/S5	Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations Staff Section
G6/S6	Signal and Communications Staff Section
GPS	Global Positioning System
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HCT	HUMINT collector team
HPT	high-payoff target
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HVT	high-value target

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IED	improvised explosive device
IMETS	Integrated Meteorological System
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	information requirement
ISM	intelligence synchronization matrix
ISP	intelligence synchronization plan
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IWEDA	Integrated Weather Effects Decision Aid
J/G2X	Joint Division Intelligence Staff Officer
JFC	joint forces commander
LEA	law enforcement agency
lic	license
LOC	line of communication
LTIOV	latest time information is of value
LZ	landing zone
MCOO	modified combined obstacles overlay
MDMP	military decision-making process
MEA	munitions effect assessment
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civilians considerations
MI	Military Intelligence
NAI	named area of interest
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation

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NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	non-government organization
NOE	nap-of-the-earth
NVD	night vision device
OAKOC	observation and fields of fire, avenue of approach, key terrain, obstacles, concealment and cover (tactical level)
OB	order of battle
obj	object
OCOKA	observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenue of approach
OE	operational environment
OMT	operational management team
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operations order
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
Plt	platoon
PYSOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
ROE	rules of engagement
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOP	standing operating procedure
sqd	squad
SWO	staff weather officer
TAI	target area of interest
TCP	traffic control point

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TIM	toxic industrial materiel
TLP	troop leading procedure
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAF	US Air Force
USAR	US Army Reserve
WARNO	warning order
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

area of influence: A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control.

area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR): An area assigned to a commander in which the commander's G2/S2 is responsible for the intelligence regarding threat forces and activity. Higher headquarters usually assigns AOIRs to a unit based on capabilities. However, the echelons can negotiate AOIRs based on the unit's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and limitations as well as in accordance with the METT-TC factors. The unit collects, analyzes, and reports on threat elements and activity within its AOIR to higher, lateral, and subordinate units.

area of interest (AOI): A geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to execute successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. It includes any threat forces or characteristics of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence accomplishment of the command's mission.

area of operations (AO): A geographical area, including the airspace above, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.

assessment: Continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments.

avenue of approach (AA): An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path.

doctrinal template: A model based on postulated enemy tactical doctrine. It generally portrays frontages, depths, echelon spacing, and force composition, as well as his disposition of combat, combat support, and combat service support units for a given type of operation. It portrays how the enemy would like to fight if he was not constrained.

enemy: The individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners.

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evaluation: In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy.

event matrix: A description of the indicators and activity expected to occur in each NAI. It normally cross-references each NAI and indicator with the times they are expected to occur and the COAs they will confirm or deny.

event template: A model against which enemy activity can be recorded and compared. It represents a sequential projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicate the enemy's ability to adopt a particular course of action. The event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance planning.

infrastructure: 1. All building and permanent installations necessary for support, redeployment, and military forces operations (e.g., barracks, headquarters, airfields, communications facilities, stores, port installations, and maintenance stations). (JP 4-01.8) (2) The basic underlying framework or feature of a thing: in economics, basic resources, communications, industries, and so forth, upon which others depend; in insurgency, the organization (usually hidden) of insurgent leadership.

intelligence: 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.

intelligence battlefield operating system (IBOS): The means (personnel, organizations, processes, and equipment) that provide relevant information and intelligence about the enemy and area of interest necessary for effective planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of military operations.

intelligence coordination line (ICL): Designates the boundary between AOIRs. The G2/S2 establishes ICLs to facilitate coordination between higher, lateral, and subordinate units; coordinate with the G3/S3 to direct subordinates to track enemy units and HPTs in their areas; and hand over intelligence responsibility for areas of the battlefield. The establishment of lCLs ensures that there are no gaps in the collection effort; that all echelons are aware of the location, mission, and capabilities of other assets; facilitates asset cross-cueing and provides timely exchange of information between assets. The G2/S2 keeps abreast of collection activities in progress (all echelons) and battlefield developments through the ICLs.

intelligence estimate: The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption.

intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB): The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. IPB is designed to support the staff estimate and military decision making process. Most intelligence requirements are generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision making process.

intelligence requirement: Those requirements generated from the staff's IRs regarding the enemy and environment that are not a part of the CCIR (PIR and FFIR). Intelligence requirements require collection and can provide answers in order to identify indicators of enemy

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actions or intent, which reduce the uncertainties associated with the operation. Significant changes (i.e., branches and sequels) with an operation usually lead to changes in intelligence requirements.

intelligence synchronization: The task that ensures ISR operations are linked to the commander's requirements and respond in time to influence decisions and operations. The intelligence officer, with staff participation, synchronizes the entire collection effort, to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelons units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the commander's CCIR (PIR and FFIR).

intelligence synchronization plan: The plan the intelligence officer uses, with staff input, to synchronize the entire collection effort, to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, in order to answer the commander's CCIR (PIR and FFIR).

key terrain: Any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which, affords a marked advantage to either combatant.

latest time information is of value (LTIOV): The time by which an intelligence organization or staff must deliver information to the requestor in order to provide decision makers with timely intelligence. This must include the time anticipated for processing and dissemination that information as well as for making the decision.

lines of communication (LOC): All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

line of sight: The unobstructed path from a soldier, weapon, weapon site, electronic sending and receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment from one point to another.

mobility corridors: Areas where a force will be canalized due to terrain constructions. The mobility corridor is relatively free of obstacles and allows military forces to capitalize on the principles of mass and speed.

named area of interest (NAI): The geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of the battlespace. Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action.

order of battle (OB): The identification strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.

priority intelligence requirements (PIR): Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making.

processing (intelligence): The process phase involves converting collected data, which is not already in a comprehensible form when it is reported, into a form that is understandable and suitable for analysis and production of intelligence. Examples of processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and correlating

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dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling like elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.

production (intelligence): Conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements.

request for information (RFI): Any specific, time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the theater command's procedures.

relevant information: All information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control.

requirements management (RM): The intelligence task that develops a prioritized list of what information needs to be collected and produced into intelligence, dynamically updates and adjusts those requirements in response to mission adjustments/changes, and places a latest time intelligence is of value to ensure intelligence and information is reported to meet operational requirements.

situation map: A map showing the tactical or the administrative situation at a particular time.

situation template: A depiction of a potential adversary course of action as part of a particular adversary operation. Situation templates are developed on the adversary's current situation (for example, training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, and disposition), the environment, and adversary doctrine or patterns of operations. The commander dictates the level to depict the adversary based on the factors of METT-TC (at minimum two levels of command below the friendly force) as a part of his guidance for mission analysis.

specific information requirement (SIR): Description of the information required to answer all or part of an intelligence requirement. A complete SIR describes the information required, the location where the required information can be collected, and the time during which it is to be collected. Generally, each intelligence requirement generates sets of SIRs.

target area of interest (TAI): The geographical area or pint along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to either abandon a particular course of action or require him to use specialized engineer support to continue, where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces.

technical control (TECHCON): The authority a controlling element has to control all technical aspects of other unit operations.

terrain analysis: The collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations.

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